ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER
2.1. Mengenal Artur Schopenhauer
Shopenhauer dapat disebut sebagai seorang filsuf yang masih mempunyai hubungan erat dengan idealisme Jerman dan murid ideal dari Kant. Tetapi Schopenhauer merupakan satu figur yang asing dalam deretan filsuf Eropa, teristimewa karena keperibadian dan karena filsafat India. Ia lahir dari sebuah keluarga pedagang di kota Danzig pada tanggal 22 Februari 1788. Ketika kota Danzig diserahkan kepada Prusia tahun 1793, keluarganya turut berimigrasi ke Hamburg dan menetap di sana sampai ayahnya meninggal tahun 1805. Ibunya adalah seorang Novelis yang kemudian mendirikan sebuah salon di Weimar. Di tempat inilah Schopenhauer kemudian berkenalan dengan Göthe yang sangat berpengaruh dalam kehidupannya selanjutnya.
Masa pendidikan Schopenhauer ditempuhnya selama dua tahun di Prancis, beberapa bulan di London dan juga di Swiss dan Austria. Selepas kematian ayahnya, ia masuk Universitas Göttingen sebagai mahasiswa kedokteran sebelum belajar fisika, kimia dan botani. Secara khusus pada kesempatan ini untuk pertama kali ia membaca karya-karya Plato dan Kant. Kedua tokoh ini kemudian menjadi tokoh yang sangat berpengaruh dalam pemikirannya dalam bidang filsafat.
Di Universitas Berlin, Schopenhauer sengaja meminta mata kuliahnya diberikan pada jam sama seperti Hegel, dengan harapan bahwa orang akan membanjiri kuliahnya dan menjauhkan Hegel yang terlalu berbelit-belit. Namun yang terjadi justru sebaliknya. Selama dua puluh tahun pertama, karya utamanya tidak banyak dikenal. Kalau kemudian filsafat Scopenhauer diperhatikan, itu lebih karena kekecewaan di Jerman dan Eropa pada umumnya setelah revolusi pada tahun 1848. Revolusi dipandang tidak mendatangkan perubahan seperti yang dibicarakan oleh Kant dan Hegel. Karena itu, sikap pesimistis menemukan pada Schopenhauer penjelasan filosofisnya.
2.2. Dasar Pemikiran Schopenhauer
Pandangan filosofis Schopenhauer terungkap dalam karya utamanya: Die Welt Wille und Vorstellung (Dunia sebagai kehendak dan gambaran). Dunia adalah gambaran, itulah satu-satunya kebenaran a priori yang kita miliki. Kita memiliki gambaran tentang dunia dan kita hanya mengenal dunia seturut gambaran yang sudah terbentuk itu. Sebuah benda an sich tidak dapat kita kenal. Yang dapat kita kenal adalah benda dalam penampilannya kepada kita.
Untuk dapat masuk dan mengenal dunia, kita tidak menemukan jalan dari luar. Dari luar, kita tidak menemukan pintu untuk masuk ke dalam rumah dunia ini. Yang ada hanya satu pintu dan pintu itu ada dalam diri kita sendiri yaitu kehendak. Pengetahuan yang benar adalah pengetahuan yang lahir dari kehendak. Bagi Schopenhauer kebenaran tidak tidak lahir dari pemikiran, kesadaran atau rasio melainkan datang dari lapisan yang lebih mendalam. Manusia sebenarnya didorong untuk hidup dan kehendak itu menggunakan ratio sebagai budaknya.
Filsuf Jerman Immanuel Kant berkutat dengan putusan-putusan atas cita rasa. Objek-objek dinilai indah, sarannya, ketika mereka memuaskan a disinterested desire: hasrat yang tidak melibatkan kepentingan atau kebutuhan personal. Ia [pernyataan tersebut] merupakan turunan dari bahwa objek-objek yang indah tidak merupakan ekspresi dari semata-mata preferensi personal tapi adalah universal. Meski orang tidak dapat merasa pasti bahwa orang lain akan terpuaskan oleh benda-benda yang dia pandang sebagai indah, ia sedikitnya dapat mengatakan bahwa orang lain seharusnya puas. Dasar bagi respon seseorang atas keindahan terdapat dalam struktur pikirannya.
Seni harus memberikan kepuasan disinterested yang sama seperti [yang diberikan/disediakan] keindahan alam. Secara paradoks, seni dapat mencapai sesuatu yang tidak dapat dilakukan alam. Ia dapat menawarkan keindahan dan ketakindahan dalam objek yang sama. Sebuah lukisan dari wajah yang buruk meski demikian tetap indah.
Menurut filsuf Jerman abad 19 G.W.F. Hegel, seni, agama, dan filsafat merupakan dasar dari perkembangan spiritual tertinggi. Keindahan dalam alam merupakan segala sesuatu yang spirit manusia dapati menyenangkan dalam pengejawantahan kebebasan intelektual dan spiritual. Hal-hal tertentu dalam alam dapat dibuat lebih congenial dan menyenangkan, dan adalah objek-objek alam ini yang direorganisir oleh seni untuk memuaskan tuntutan-tuntutan estetis.
Filsuf Jerman Arthur Schopenhauer percaya bahwa bentuk-bentuk dalam alam semesta, seperti bentuk-bentuk abadi Platonis, eksis di luar dunia pengalaman, dan bahwa kepuasan dicapa melalui kontemplasi atasnya demi mereka sendiri, sebagai suatu cara membebaskan diri dari dunia pengalaman sehari-hari yang memilukan.
Schopenhauer (1788-1860) selalu menyebut-nyebut filsafat Kant sebagai sumber dari filsafatnya dan Plato sebagai orang yang sangat digemarinya. Segala seni mempunyai tempat tertentu di dalam idea yang dibentangkan dalam bukunya yang berjudul “World as Will and Idea”. Keindahan barang yang indah, menurut Schopenhauer, mempunyai dua segi, yaitu membebaskan dari kemauan. Kemauan untuk hidup di segi lain mengisi pikiran dengan suatu “gagasan”, suatu obyektifikasi kemauan hingga mencapai suatu tingkat dimana kita melihat obyek khusus dari pengamatan estetis. Sebagaimana segala sesuatu pada taraf tertentu merupakan suatu obyektifikasi dari kemauan, maka segala sesuatu adalah juga karateristis dalam taraf tertentu indah. Tidaklah ada perbedaan yang lebih jauh antara seni dan alam selain bahwa di dalam seni, seniman meminjamkan matanya kepada kita untuk melihat, karena seninya dapat memahami bahasa alam yang diucapkan setengah-setengah, sehingga dapat melahirkan apa yang ingin dilahirkan oleh alam tapi belum berhasil.
Menurut Schopenhaure, seni yang tertinggi ialah musik. Alam adalah musik yang telah terjelma di dalam barang-barang. Musik adalah seni yang terselinap di dalam dunia ini, dan ia merupakan sesuatu yang sangat menenangkan tapi tidak dapat dinyatakan, ia mirip dengan surga yang telah kita kenal tapi tidak pernah dapat diketahui, sangat masuk akal tapi tidak dapat sama sekali diterangkan.
Arsitektur adalah seni yang paling rendah, setingkat dengan seni mencangkul kebun, karena sangat dekat dengan hajat jasmani manusia. Tingkat di atasnya adalah seni lukis dan seni patung, kemudian lebih tinggi dari itu seni sastra (puisi), dan menyusul seni drama, tragedia dan komedia. Tragedia dapat membawa kita untuk mengikuti perasaan “manusia mutlak”, kata Schopenhaure, dan hal itu terjadi dengan perantaraan rasa belas kasihan. Belas kasihan adalah indera yang keenam, karena manusia tidak akan dapat mengetahui barang-barang kecuali bila ia menaruh simpati kepada mereka dan menaruh rasa belas kasihan kepada kemanusiaan. Rasa simpati adalah tujuan terakhir dari semua filsafat.
Menurut Schopenhaure, seni adalah jalan yang terbagus untuk mencapai pengetahuan murni tentang dunia, karena seni adalah “mekarnya segala yang ada”. Kalau kemauan itu memilukan, untuk hidup itu menyedihkan, maka seni adalah hiburan yang terbaik, dan merupakan tempat istirahat yang terjamin. Disatu pihak, seni membangkitkan kekuatan dan menghilangkan rasa lelah tapi dipihak lain ia juga mendatangkan semangat keindahan yang menghapuskan krisis-krisis dalam hidup.
Schopenhaure mempunyai pandangan mengenai kecantikan yang berlainan dari pandangan kita. Kalau Kant menganggap lelaki bersifat agung dan wanita bersifat cantik, maka Schopenhaure memandang kedua-duanya adalah cantik. Akan tetapi, kata dia, lelaki adalah justru lebih cantik daripada wanita. Kelabihan pada jenis laki-laki ini tidak terbatas pada manusia, tapi bahkan dibuktikan oleh jenis binatang-binatang. Ayam jantan adalah labih cantik dari ayam betina; bulunya, potongan tubuhnya, geraknya dan sebagainya. Kuda jantan lebih cantik dari kuda betina, burung, ikan, binatang-binatang lainnya yang berjenis kelamin,laki-laki adalah lebih cantik dari yang betina.
Akan tetapi seni tidaklah merupakan surga yang terakhir karena kesenangan yang terdalam menghendaki ketenangan mutlak, dan keindahan adalah mirip dengan kemusnahan. Di sini Estetika berubah menjadi mistika, dan orang yang mencapai pemusnahan dirinya dan inilah Nirvana. Dan memang Schopenhaure adalah banyak terpengaruh oleh filsafat India. Meskipun mempunyai pengaruh besar dikemudian hari, namun hasil karyanya lebih mirip kepada karya pujangga dari pada karya seorang ahli filsafat. Munculnya pemikiran Schopenhaure habislah warisan sumbangan pikiran para pengikut Kant, dan jaman baru dewasa ini adalah kelanjutan dari jaman filsafat kritika (Wadjiz 1985: 38-41).
Dalam buku The World as Will and Idea (1909), filsuf Jerman yang memegang teguh tradisi Kantianism dan idealism, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), mengemukakan bahwa hidup manusia dijalani dalam tatanan ganda sekaligus, yakni “makrokosmos” (dunia) dan “mikrokosmos” (diri sendiri). Tetapi, kematian itu unik. Meski terjadi di tatanan mikro, kematian bukan suatu pengalaman, tetapi “akhir” yang menutup seluruh pengalaman. Dalam hal ini, pintu pemahaman tertutup bagi manusia. Ia tidak diberkahi kemampuan (faculty) untuk memahaminya (Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 1785).
2.3. Penderitaan dan Keselamatan
Schopenhauer melihat kehidupan sebagai penderitaan karena menurutnya kehendak itu terbatas, sementara kemungkinan pemenuhan kehendak terbatas pula. Kita tidak akan pernah menemukan pemenuhan dan pemuasan semua dorongan keinginan nafsu kita. Kalau demikian, sumber penderitaan adalah diri kita sendiri.
Penderitaan mengungkapkan kehendak sebagai daya yang terbesar pada manusia. Kekuatan kehendak menjadi nyata dalam penderitaan, sebab penderitaan lahir dari perbedaan antara kehedak dan kemampuan untuk memenuhinya. Manusia selalu merasa tidak puas, mengalami munculnya keinginan yang satu sesudah pemuasan yang lain. Sebuah penderitaan muncul setelah penderitaan yang lain diatasi. Penderitaan itu adalah realitas yang biasa di dunia, sedangkan kebahagiaan hanyalah sebuah negativitas, yakni ketiadaan dari penderitaan.
3.DUA JALAN PELEPASAN KEHENDAK DALAM DIRI MANUSIA MENURUT PANDANGAN ARTUR SCHOPENHAUER
3.1. Memaknai Arti Pelepasan Kehendak
Kata “pelepasan” berasal dari kata dasar lepas: dapat bergerak (lari) ke mana-mana: tidak tertambat, bebas dari ikatan; tidak terikat lagi, melarikan diri, bebas dari hukuman. Kata ini kemudian mendapat awalan ke- dan akhiran –an menjadi kata “pelepasan”: proses, cara, perbuatan, pemecatan (dari tugas), dubur, anus. Dari arti kata di atas kata pelepasan mengandung arti suatu proses lepas dari sesuatu.
Menurut Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia, kata kehendak berasal dari kata dasar hendak: mau; akan; bermaksud akan. Kata ini kemudian mendapat awalan ke- menjadi “kehendak”: kemauan; keinginan dan harapan yang keras. Dari arti kata ini, kata kehendak mengandung arti kemauan atau keinginan dan harapan yang keras untuk dapat memiliki sesuatu atau dapat mencapai sesuatu.
Dalam Kamus Filsafat, kata kehendak mengandung beberapa pengertian. Istilah ini mengacu pada suatu potensi, fakultas atau daya di dalam manusia yang terlibat di dalam pengambilan keputusan. Hal ini berhubungan dengan ratio seseorang dalam mengambil suatu keputusan. Kamus Filsafat melihat kehendak sebagai: Mengetahui dan menghendaki merupakan dua bentuk fundamental kegiatan spiritual. Menghendaki tidak mutlak dalam arti bahwa menghendaki lebih mengacu pada usaha untuk mencapai yang baik yang akan dicapai atau dihasilkan. Kegiatan dasar kehendak adalah afirmasi terhadap nilai atau cinta. Objek khusus kehendak mutlak adalah nilai mutlak atau kebaikan pada dirinya. Kehendak itu sendiri merupakan suatu keinginan akan sesuatu hanya kalau kebaikan tidak disamakan dengan kehendak atau sama sekali tidak dihubungkan dengan kehendak. Sedangkan objek khusus kehendak sama dengan objek khusus kehendak mutlak yaitu nilai pada diri sendiri. Objek dari kegiatan kehendak diinginkan karena kebaikannya sedikit banyak memberikan sumbangan bagi penyempurnaan seseorang yang menghendakinya.
3.2.3. Menurut Pandangan Para Filsuf
Para filsuf melihat arti kehendak secara berbeda-beda menurut pandangan mereka masing-masing: Nietzsche (1844-1900), melihat kehendak sebagai kehendak untuk berkuasa. Kehendak untuk berkuasa adalah kharakter dari segala yang ada. Ini merupakan jawaban atas pertanyaan apa artinya “berada”. Berada berarti berada seturut kehendak untuk berkuasa. Segala sesuatu yang ada selalu berada dalam proses menjadi. Kehendak memberi jawaban dalam dirinya “ya atas kehidupan”. Karena ia menghendaki sesuatu yang lain maka ia terbuka terhadap apa yang lain itu. Tidak ada pemisahan antara kehendak dan yang dikehendaki. Dalam kehendak kita menemukan diri kita sebagaimana diri kita berada. Dengan demikian kehendak selalu ada dalam diri manusia sekalipun manusia kadang tak menyadari akan eksistensi kehendak itu sendiri. Sedangka Kant, (1724-1804) melihat kehendak sebagai bagian dari keinginan yang beraksi dalam bentuk konsep. Ia hampir menyamakan kehendak dengan ratio. Fakultas kehendak dapat bekerja tanpa memperhitungkan keinginan dan kecendrungan dan penentu kegiatan-kegiatan kehendak adalah ratio praktis sendiri . Dikatakan bahwa prinsip-prinsip praktis adalah proposisi-proposisi yang berisi ketentuan umum kehendak, yang memiliki beberapa aturan praktis. Prinsip-prinsip itu bersifat subjektif, atau berupa maksim-maksim, ketika kondisi ini oleh subjek dianggap sahih hanya bagi kehendaknya sendiri. Prinsip-prinsip itu bersifat objektif, atau merupakan hukum praktis, ketika kondisi tersebut oleh subjek diketahui objektif, yakni sahih untuk kehendak setiap mahluk rasional .
Dengan mengasumsikan bahwa akal budi murni mempunyai sebuah dasar praktis yang mencakupi untuk menentukan kehendak, maka dijumpai adanya hukum-hukum praktis. Namun, semua prinsip praktis hanyalah maksim-maksim. Di dalam kehendak makhluk rasional yang dipengaruhi oleh perasaan, mungkin saja terjadi konflik antara maksim dan hukum praktis yang diketahui oleh makhluk tersebut. Misalnya, seorang dapat menganggap sebagai maksimnya sikap untuk tidak toleren terhadap tindakan balas dendam, tetapi pada saat yang sama mengetahui bahwa sikap ini hanya maksimnya sendiri, bukan hukum praktis, dan bahwa jika dianggap sebagai aturan untuk kehendak setiap makhluk rasional, sikap itu inkonsisten dengan dirinya sendiri.
Hegel, 1770-1854) mengaitkan kehendak dengan apa yang disebut pengetahuan. Roh absolut “Geist” yang mewujudkan diri dalam kehendak dan dalam sapere/ pengetahuan. Unsur yang paling dominan dalam kehendak adalah intelek. Intelek membimbing pengetahuan untuk menunjukkan dirinya sebagai sesuatu yang berada. Ia kemudian melihat kehendak dalam konteks kekuasaan. Menghendaki adalah kemampuan untuk memimpin atau menguasai. Kehendak untuk lebih kuat berarti kehendak untuk lebih di atas, melampaui yang lain. Dalam proses tertentu ia menjadi sangat kreatif dan pada waktu yang lain lebih destruktif sebagai penyebab kehancuran.
Dalam doktrin Aristoteles dan Plato tentang tiga bagian jiwa, kehendak terletak antara ratio dan nafsu-nafsu. Bagi keduanya, kehendak lebih dekat dengan yang pertama daripada yang terakhir. Ratiolah yang berfungsi mengontrol kehendak. Manusia berkewajiban membangun kebiasaan-kebiasaan yang baik yang memungkinkan kontrol macam ini. Aquinas mengikuti garis yang sama. Kehendak didefinisikan sebagai nafsu intelektual yang dipengaruhi dan mempengaruhi ratio.
Bagi Hobbes, (1588-1679) kehendak berhubungan dengan nafsu-nafsu. Malahan ia menganggap kehendak sebagai mata rantai terakhir dari rangkaian nafsu-nafsu yang menuju tindakan. Ia memandang tenaga kehendak sebagai hampir tak terbatas dibandingkan dengan keterbatasan yang dilalui ratio. Baginya, kekuatan kehendaklah yang memungkinkan kebebasan manusia.
3.3.Dua Jalan Pelepasan dari Penderitaan
Adakah jalan keluar dari lembah penderitaan ini? Dikatakan bahwa pengetahuan bukanlah jalan keluar yang tepat, sebab semakin tinggi derajat sebuah mahluk yang ditandai kesanggupan pengetahuan, semakin besar pula kesanggupannya untuk menderita. Pada tahap ini, Schopenhauer melihat adanya sebuah jalan keluar yang ditawarkan oleh kesenian. Kesenian adalah permenungan tentang sesuatu terlepas dari relasi kausalitas dan terpisah dari penentuan kehendak. Kesenian adalah kemampuan untuk hanya memperhatikan, untuk membiarkan yang ada berbicara, untuk menjadi sangat objektif, dan dari pengamatan itu dapat mengulangi yang diamat dalam karya seni.
Bagi Schopenhauer individu-individu dapat mengatasi dunia dan penderitaannya dengan kontemplasi filosofis, transendensi melalui pengalaman estetis dan belas kasihan . Inilah yang dinamakan jalan pelepasan kehendak. Manusia semestinya tidak bergembira karena manusia hidup, sebaliknya harus meratapi fakta tersebut. Lebih baik tiada daripada ada, lebih baik tiada daripada hidup. Bagi Schopenhauer kehidupan adalah sesuatu yang seharusnya tidak ada. Kalau seorang individu memilih, dia akan menolak kehidupan sebab dia telah mengerti bahwa dunia ini sia-sia. Semua keadaan dalam kehidupan berakhir sebagai frustrasi, tidak bahagia, ilusi atau menyakitkan. Hal ini disebabkan hidup di dunia selalu diliputi oleh penderitaan, keputusaasaan, ketidakpastian, kekecewaan, ketidakberdayaan, kehilangan harapan dan kematian. Schopenhauer kemudian menyimpulkan bahwa dunia ini merupakan kemungkinan yang terburuk, tidak ada yang lebih buruk yang dapat diciptakan atau dibayangkan. Dunia dilihat sebagai ungkapan dari kehendak yang buta serta irasional. Segala sesuatu memiliki kehendak untuk hidup dan konsekuensinya ialah adanya penderitaan.
Di alam yang bebas, kehendak yang demikian menampakkan diri dalam berbagai wujud makhluk hidup yang hanya akan melihat dan menyantap makhluk-makhluk lain. Dunia dan manusia menurut dasarnya yang terdalam merupakan kehendak. Dorongan untuk mempertahankan hidup dan memperoleh kesejahteraan adalah dua hal yang juga merupakan kemauan kehendak yang memaksa orang untuk melakukan apa yang disebut dosa. Menurutnya, setiap keinginan yang sudah dipuaskan menghasilkan keinginan baru yang juga harus dipuaskan lagi, dan begitu seterusnya tanpa berhenti. Namun kemungkinan-kemungkinan untuk memuaskannya terbatas, sehingga tidak ada yang bisa benar-benar memuaskan. Kenyataan untuk terus memuaskan diri secara terus-menerus semacam ini, pada suatu taraf orang akan merasa bosan dan frustrasi. Hal ini dilihat oleh schopenhauer sebagai penderitaan. Apabila telah ada satu penderitaan maka akan muncul penderitaan baru.
Apakah penyebab dari semua penderitaan ini? Hal ini disebabkan oleh kehendak itu sendiri. Menurutnya, seperti yang dikutip oleh Simon Petrus, “karena disiksa dan didorong oleh tuntutan-tuntutan kehendak untuk hidup. Kehendak untuk hidup itu adalah Dosa Asal. Maksudnya, sama seperti dosa asal yang membawa penderitaan bagi semua keturunan Nabi Adam, demikian juga kehendak untuk hidup menjadi sebab bagi banyak malapetaka dan kesengsaraan yang menimpa manusia”. Dalam mengatasi kenyataan di atas ia menawarkan dua jalan. Kedua jalan itu adalah kontemplasi estetis dan jalan etis. Untuk dapat mendalami ajarannya tentang dua jalan pelepasan ini, maka pada uraian selanjutnya akan dilihat dan diuraikan lebih jelas tentang dua jalan ini.
3.3.1.Kontemplasi Estetis
Dengan kontemplasi estetis, manusia dapat memadamkan hasrat-hasratnya. Karya seni atau hal yang berhubungan dengan seni bisa menimbulkan gairah. Kesenian adalah jalan permenungan tentang sesuatu terlepas dari relasi kausalitas dan terpisah dari penentuan kehendak. Kesenian adalah kemampuan untuk hanya memperhatikan, untuk membiarkan yang ada berbicara, untuk menjadi sangat objektif, dan dari pengamatan itu dapat mengulangi yang diamat dalam karya seni. Dan hal ini hanya ada pada orang-orang jenius. Yang jenius adalah yang menyerahkan diri sepenuhnya kepada sesuatu.
Schopenhauer memberi tempat istimewa bagi seni. Dalam seni orang dapat mengenal aspek pembentukkan ulang dari kenyataan. Bidang itu adalah musik . Musik adalah ungkapan langsung dari kehendak dan dengan demikian ia berasal dari hakekat dunia. Di dalamnya seluruh dunia dan manusia menunjukkan dirinya. Melalui musik kehendak semesta langsung berbicara kepada kita. Musik adalah realitas di belakang konsep-konsep yang menawarkan diri secara langsung. Agendi atau aksi dilihat Schopenhauer sebagai kehendak dari sang seniman. Tugas seni harus memimpin subjek untuk membebaskan diri dari objektivitas tertentu untuk menggapai idea murni. Musik adalah ungkapan langsung dari kehendak dan dengan demikian ia berasal dari hakekat dunia. Di dalamnya seluruh dunia dan manusia menunjukkan dirinya. Melalui musik kehendak semesta langsung berbicara kepada kita. Musik adalah realitas di belakang konsep-konsep yang menawarkan diri secara langsung. Agendi atau aksi dilihat Schopenhauer sebagai kehendak dari sang seniman. Tugas seni harus memimpin subjek untuk membebaskan diri dari objektivitas tertentu untuk menggapai idea murni Namun ini dilihatnya sebagai suatu hal yang bukan merupakan kehendak estetis. Sebuah pengalaman estetis adalah usaha memandang objek keindahan bukan sebagai objek nafsu. Sebuah kontemplasi estetis adalah usaha menemukan makna keindahan dalam objek itu. Baru dengan sikap kontemplatif ini manusia tanpa pamrih, lalu bebas dari perbuatan kehendak atau penderitaan.
Kontemplasi estetis memang hanya mungkin untuk sementara waktu saja. Ia dapat seakan-akan untuk sementara melindungi kita terhadap keresahan dorongan dan keinginan, tetapi kita tak dapat mengunci diri di dalamnya untuk selamanya. Saat kontemplasi manusia lupa akan penderitaannya, jiwanya tentram, tapi sesudah itu dia akan mengalami penderitaan lagi. Pelarian yang dilakukannya ini hanya bersifat sementara waktu saja. Hal ini bukanlah suatu hal yang kekal, yang dapat memberikan ketenangan abadi kepada manusia.
3.3.2.Jalan Etis
Jalan etika adalah jalan yang baik menuju pembebasan. Pelepasan yang langgeng adalah pelepasan yang dapat diperoleh lewat jalan etis. Kehendak adalah suatu tuntutan dalam diri yang harus dipenuhi. Kehendak dapat menjadi cambuk yang mematikan dalam hidup seseorang. Oleh karena itu kehendak dapat menghasilkan penderitaan yang dapat disimpulkan juga bahwa kehidupan itu adalah suatu hal yang buruk atau jahat.
Schopenhauer melihat penderitaan itu seperti orang Kristen yang harus memikul salib sebagai penderitaan dan seruan untuk menolak dunia sebagai jalan keluar dari penderitaan. Penolakan terhadap dunia, itulah jalan lain untuk membebaskan diri dari kehendak. Dengan demikian kalau manusia mau lepas dari penderitaan dan kejahatan hidup ini dia harus menolak kehendak untuk hidup. Namun hal yang tak menyenangkan dari pandangan ini bahwa orang harus bunuh diri. Ini berarti bahwa tindakan bunuh diri adalah suatu tindakan moral yang tinggi. Hal itu juga berarti bahwa orang enggang berhadapan dengan suatu perkara yang dianggap tidak dapat ditangani. Menghadapi kenyataan ini, Schopenhauer berhasil menjawabnya dengan mengatakan bahwa tindakan bunuh diri justru merupakan sikap tunduk kepada kehendak untuk hidup itu, bukan penolakan atasnya. Keinginan untuk bunuh diri menurutnya seperti yang dikutip oleh Hardiman merupakan ungkapan tersembunyi dari kehendak untuk hidup. Jadi, dengan bunuh diri orang malah melakukan kejahatan. Jalan yang harus ditempuh bukannya bunuh diri, melainkan moralitas. Moralitas adalah suatu hal yang sangat khas dalam filsafatnya. Manusia merasa bebas hanya dari tampak luarnya saja (secara fenomenal), padahal secara hakiki (numenal) manusia adalah budak kehendak. Pada kenyataan ini, manusia berusaha keluar dari kenyataan fenomena ini dengan berusaha untuk menemukan sebuah simpati etis terhadap manusia lain. Hal yang dilakukan adalah dengan melakukan kebaikan. Dengan kebaikan manusia berharap dapat menemukan cinta kasih yang dapat melepaskan dirinya dari sikap egoisme dan kelekatan manusia pada hasrat-hasrat rendah dan dengan itu dia telah berusaha untuk menolak kehendak. Bila orang telah sampai pada taraf ini, dunia dianggapnya sebagai sebuah ketiadaan dan akan mencapai Nirvana. Nirvana adalah pemadaman total kehendak; dan karena kehendak itu lenyap, dunia juga menjadi ketiadaan (banyak dipengaruhi oleh ajaran Buddha) . Dengan mencapai Nirwana orang akan mengalami ketiadaan eksistensi individualnya. Dengan itu pula keinginan tidak akan ada lagi, tidak ada kehendak dan tidak ada dunia.
3.4.Catatan Kritis Atas Pandangan Schopenhauer Tentang Dua Jalan Pelepasan
Dari uraian diatas, penulis dapat melihat bahwa pada dasarnya Schopenhauer memusuhi hidup ini. Hidup ini dilihatnya sebagai belenggu yang terus melilit diri. Hal-hal lahiriah dalam diri manusia/ dorongan-dorongan (Keinginan, nafsu, insting, hasrat dan kemauan) merupakan unsur yang selalu ada dan selalu mewarnai diri manusia. Bila manusia mengelak akan keberadaan hal-hal di atas berarti manusia telah menyangkal diri dan hidupnya sendiri, apalagi kalau keinginan seseorang tak dapat dipenuhi. Keadaan menderita dan kecewa akan terus mewarnai perilaku manusia yang kemudian akan menyengsarakan manusia itu sendiri.
Manusia adalah makhluk yang diciptakan Tuhan sebagai makhluk yang mempunyai kelebihan dalam bertindak dan berpikir. Hal ini didorong oleh kehendak akal yang ada pada diri manusia. Kesenangan dilihat sebagai sesuatu yang sangat diinginkan dalam kodrat alami kita. Namun tak dapat disangkal pula bahwa kehendak dapat menyebabkan kesengsaraan pada diri manusia. Kehendak yang berakibatkan kesengsaraan ini dilihat oleh Schopenhauer sebagai hal yang tak baik dan harus dihindari. Itu berarti, ia tidak mengakui kodrat manusia lagi. Oleh karena itu ia harus melihat kembali kebelakang bagaimanakah manusia itu diciptakan menurut kodratnya. Manusia telah dianugerahi Tuhan seperti yang ada sekarang. Itu berarti manusia juga punya kehendak. Jalan yang ditawarkannya memang dapat mengurangi penderitaan manusia tapi tak dapat menghilangkannya. Mati bukanlah jalan keluar yang tepat karena yang dapat mengambil nyawa seseorang hanyalah Tuhan. Bunuh diri adalah perbuatan yang menamatkan hayat atau perbuatan memusnahkan diri karena enggan berhadapan dengan suatu perkara yang dianggap tak dapat ditangani. Tindakan bunuh diri lazimnya berlaku kepada mereka yang menghadapi tekanan. Mereka ini akan bertindak di luar akal pemikiran yang waras. Penulis lebih mendukung pemikiran Kant bahwa dalam kehendak ada kesesuaian secara menyeluruh keinginan dengan hukum moral yang merupakan kondisi paling tinggi dari kebaikan tertinggi. Kesesuaian ini pasti dimungkinkan sebagaimana objeknya, karena dia termasuk didalam perintah yang mengharuskan kita untuk lebih mementingkan objeknya. Kesesuaian antara kehendak dengan hukum moral adalah kesucian yang merupakan kesempurnaan di mana tidak ada makhluk rasional di dunia indra yang mampu memisahkannya.
4.PENUTUP
Manusia adalah makhluk berkehendak. Sebagai manusia yang berkehendak, ia dapat melakukan apa saja untuk memenuhi dirinya. Keadaan untuk dapat memenuhi kebutuhan hidup yang terus-menerus dan sulit untuk dihindarkan adalah sebuah penderitaan. Hal ini yang dilihat oleh Schopenhauer. Penderitaan ini sangat menyiksa hidup manusia.
Sehubungan dengan hal di atas, ia menawarkan dua jalan pembebasan. Kedua jalan itu adalah jalan kontemplasi estetis dan jalan etis. Jalan kontemplasi estetis ditempuh melalui musik. Lewat musik atau seni orang dapat melepaskan penderitaan yang dideritanya karena unsur kehendak. Dengan kontemplasi estetis, manusia dapat memadamkan hasrat-hasratnya. Karya seni atau hal yang berhubungan dengan seni bisa menimbulkan gairah. Cara pertama ini meliputi semua bidang kesenian dengan memuncak pada seni musik sebagai suatu penghentian ‘tekanan’ kehendak umum dan buta, tetapi hanya selama pengalaman akan seni itu ada. Kesenian adalah jalan permenungan tentang sesuatu terlepas dari relasi kausalitas dan terpisah dari penentuan kehendak. Kesenian adalah kemampuan untuk hanya memperhatikan, untuk membiarkan yang ada berbicara, untuk menjadi sangat objektif, dan dari pengamatan itu dapat mengulangi yang diamat dalam karya seni.
Jalan etis adalah jalan kedua yang ditawarkan olehnya ditempuh dengan cara menolak hidup ini. Jalan yang kedua ini tetap pada pengingkaran diri (askese). Hidup yang penuh penderitaan harus dilalui atau dilewati dengan penderitaan. Namun itu tidak berarti baginya untuk menghalalkan kematian. Hal itu telah melanggar hukum moral. Tindakan bunuh diri hanya merupakan suatu sikap tunduk kepada kehendak yang akan tetap membawa penderitaan. Orang harus berbuat baik dalam terang cinta kasih yang kemudian membawanya pada kehidupan di Nirvana.
Kedua jalan diatas dilihat oleh penulis bukanlah suatu jalan yang baik sebab menghindar dari kenyataan yang hanya sementara waktu bukanlah cara yang paling baik apalagi harus bunuh diri. Kematian dengan cara bunuh diri bukanlah suatu cara yang halal dan itu melanggar moral. Hal itu juga berarti bahwa ia tak menghendaki hidup ini. Hidup hanya bisa diakhiri oleh Tuhan.
Senin, 21 Desember 2009
ESTETIKA 1A-SUSAN SONTAG
SUSAN SONTAG
CAMP
Camp may look simple in comparison to other artistic and cultural forms because its materials come from everyday world – the images, wigs, cosmetics, clothes, shoes, mascara, nail polish, labels, songs, fabrics, textures and shape of popular and high culture.
Have to be reworked and filtered trough the camp sensibility so that the quality of camp in them can be discovered seen. Indeed, the distinctively camp sensibility trough which such form are transmuted could only have emerged out of a complex history often glossed under the name of moderenity. Camp is an artifact of that modernity, the doppelganger of moderenist high seriousness, responding to that earnestness by resurre ecting artifice in place of art, and style in place of content. Historically specific,what this concept reveales is the essential historicity of aesthetic form. The “conditions for the possibility” of camp are in essence as complex as those of moderenity itself, requiring a fourth critique in the post – cantianvein of this most un-cantiansensibility. Let us call in the critique of pure camp, or , more succinctly the cxritique of upper new york as the territory of camp par excellent, and , appropriately, the place just below which camp received its first “serious” description in 1961 by susan sontag.
Camp is a way of life, a mode of embodiment in the modernt world of consumeristich societies, a mode of arranging preferences, deploying tastes , making judgements, attching oneself --- or failing to – to others, perhaps a politics but certainly an aesthetic in the fullest sense of this wored. Indeed, as a form of lebenskunsterism propelled by an indifference to all norms of quality, in its love of the déclassé , the ordinaire , the exaggerated , and the awful its match the free thingking and free living spirit of a don Giovanni, although , at the same time resolutely refusing his machismo in favor of a more :feminized” relation to shopping,. Testing, sampling. And trying on. The proof of life, one might say, resides in the fact of probare: of trying things on—the wigs, dark glasses , and mae west gestures , the bad movies , old costumes, and the colletage of an andy Warhol turned aging French chanteuse (heard, of course , over the radio on dark nights in the cellars of new york). It is this transposition of the deep emotionality of the chanteuse in to the pleasure of her voice, her dress, and her sageging face that converts the high seriousness of art in to the pleasures of its camping double, just as cantian morality becomes replaced in the world of camp by the taste for drag queens , overweight rockstars and old rageous clothes purchased at outrageously discount—or, conversely, outrageously over – the – top – prices
What is common to all this these acts, things , and behaviours, what makes them can in the first instance is the eradication of any traces of the “natural” in its broadest sense. Camp occludes those norms of the social world that have trough time, training, and custom become “naturalized,” the fetishization of capital that has taken on the appearance of the natural, and the inner instincts of love, work, and attachment that spontaneously arise in those who fall under the name of the human. This norms and instincts become for the camp sensibility the objects of this placement , the occasion for theatrical games that placed them under suspension and replace them with a love of the low, the florid, and the playful. In a pre-postmodern vein, camp celebrates the simulacrum , runs riot with the fetish of capital by harping on its essential unnaturalness—exploiting the commodification of live in a disneylad of the imagination. It turns its back on the very idea of authenticity , turning the avant-garde into an occasion for an all – night party were the “camper” can enjoyed his or her private form of outrageousness. Intstead of mourning the lost of reality , the crying, the instrumentalism of consumer society, and lamenting the commodification of the subject , camp pushes this “evils” to their limts, embraching the idea of artifice and artificiality. Iam only as good as my dye job , my liposuction , my manicure, my designer body , my plastic surgeon, my bank balance, an that is just fine. This is all that is worth seeing of me : the rest eye consigen to silence and the graveyard of grafity. Camp is a protection against the lost of real life, a real family, real feelings, real community. Because these are also the losses the arise out of the process of urbanization that are associated with big city life and all its concomitante evils and pleasures , camp is essentially a first- world , big- city phenomenon. It is difficult to imagine a camp sensibility existing in the developing world, although many of this products – especially those produced for the tourist market—appear camp to first- world travelers. Camp is the silver lining in the cloud of moderenity , the recipe for commuting modern disemchantment in to fun in games. It is thus unthinkable a part from the fact of moderenity.
The etymology of the term dates from the sixteenth century English where young men who wore the costumes of women in performance were described as “camping”, andpossibly also from the French word champagne, where theatrical troupes turning life on its head often performed. The term’s subsequent hisyory is obscure. What is clear is that by the early 1960s, when Susan Sontag’s locus classicus “Notes on Camp” was written, it was already a term enjoying a certain urban vogue. In deference to the ephemeral quality of the concept (what Charles Baudelaire might see as one-half of its modern character), Sontag eschews the linear essay from in favor of fifty-eight remarks or “jottings” tat attempt to outline camp as an aesthetic, vision, a quality projected onto objects and characteristic of certain people, a behavior (“to camp” as verb), and a pattern of taste. She outline three aesthetic attitudes and places came third,following on the sensibility of seriousness (which dominates tradisional high culture) and that of “anguish,cruelty,derangement,”which,according to here somewhat Ingmar bergemenesque view,dominates modernism.the first sensibility offers for our enjoyment the successful fulfillment of it’s aims,which susan sontag outlines as truth,beauty,and seriousness.on such a basis,we apprise and declare valuable such works as the paintings of Rembrandt van rijn,the music of wolfgang amadeusmozart the sonnets of William shakerspeare,and all the great works of the classical that we cherish and adore and that ate so difficult to turn into the objects of camping. The avant-garde, according to Sontag’s (somewhat questionable) idea, rejects truth and beauty,, but is valued for its very fragmentation of those ideals, andindeed for its violence, emotionality, and extremism (again, according to the Sontag of 1961). These two sensibilities for the possibility for the emergence of camp. Camp does not engage in opposional polemics against these other sensibilities (that would be an avant-garde stance) inasmuch as it ooffers an alternative of divine indifference to them: ignoring “both the harmonies of traditional seriousness, and the risk of fully identifying with extreme states of feeling” in favor of style and aesthetticization (Sontag, 1966, p. 287). One could not understand the concept and phenomenon of camp without first having the former sensibilities in place.
The hallmarks of camp taste are those already touched on-a love of artifice, decoration, style, the objects of the visual world, exaggeration, role playing, the cult of the personality, and extravagance. The motivations for camp are as complex and overdetermined as are the societies that provide its mise-en-scene. For Sontag, “the relation between boredom and Camp taste cannot be overestimated” (ibid). In a penetrating and original display of moderenist sensibility directed toward the play that is camp, she describes camp as a “ feat goaded on , in the last analysis, by the treat of the boredom” (ibid). because to be bored implies a certain leisure and hence a certain degree of wealth, she concludes that camp only occurs in “societies or circles capable of experiencing the pyshcopathology of affluence” (ibid). writing years ahead of her time, she also recognizes in camp implicite of an identity politics as yet unable to voice its name and speaks of camps tendensi to reverse classical and avant-grade norms and its excessive attachment to stylization as encouding the desert of certain groups for self – legitimization. A sensibility, sontag notes, often perform this function (it is for this reason that one may speak of it as expressive). With its sense of theatricalization and play, camp is often seen as a gay (sontag use the term homosexual) sensibility- one that, in thumbing its nose at conventional morality, seeks to overcome the barriers of “the norm” and one that contain more then a hint of gender reversal and cross-dressing. Yet, despitr its strong association with gay men, camp taste , she notes is not equivalent to “gay taste” (first because there is no essentializable quantity, and second because the domain of the happy camper is a straight as well as a gay domain, just as it is both male and female one). Sontag also finds a suprising kind of humanity in the camp sensibility, a general city and kindness toward the human condition that comes from its refusal of established hirerarchies of taste and its love of the overlooked, the idiosyncratic and the ordinaire. Indeed, sontag insists that camps nastiness (perhaps bitchiness is a more appropriate word) is its mode of identification rather than high-handed (I.e., modernists) judgment (people who share this sensibility are not laughing at the thing they label as “a camp,” they are enjoying it. “Camp is a tender feeling” (sontag, 1961, p. 292; emphasis in original). Here lies the difference between being camp and being dandified-a difference that Sontag begins briefly to outline (“the dandy overbred. His posture was disdain or ennui”) and that will be explored here in more detail.
The historical conditions that conspire to make camp possible, namely, those of modernity itself, must be taken more seriously than Sontag did. To glean this point, one should turn to the prefigurement of the camp sensibility in that artifact og nineteenth-century bourgeois consumerism-the dandy. Sontag describes camp as modernity`s answer for the masses to the designer outfit, so the camp personality is a way to be a dandy in the “age of mass culture.” In contrast, the dandy of the nineteenth century was a product of the elite, a man who, in Baudelaire`s words, “has been brought up amid luxury and has been accustomed since his earliest days to the obedience of others” (Baudelaire, 1946). In this case, the use of the masculine pronoun to describe dandyism is intentional because the concept is strictly limited to men only; for, despite its emphasis on grooming and the toilette, an clothes, etiquette, self-presentation, the collection of beautiful objects, and the dedication to pleasure, leisure, and affairs of the heart, dandyism was for the hypermasculine, analogous to, in the words of Baudelaire, “the strictest monastic order” (ibid). despite attention to what might be considered the trivia of life, Beudelaire insist that dandyism was impelled by a need to fight and eradicate triviality. From this need, he argues, sprang the dany`s haughtiness, his rejection of the ordinary and the base, his love of the heroic gesture, and above all, his coldness:”Dandyism is a sunset: like the decliningdaystar it is without heat and full of melancholy” (ibid).
In his contempt for the “vulgarity” of contemporary life, egendered by the Paris of the nineteenth century with its rising bourgeois class, its democratizion of taste, and its creation of the spectacle of Parisian shopping and Parisian display, the dandy looked back to the past, even as far back as to the antique past of Julius Caesar, in order to invent a “new” aristocracy and liniage for himself. In its coldness, its love of a romantic invented past, its refusal to be defiled by the ordinary present, its exclusivity and dedication to privilege and the “duties” that attend such a station-in other words, in its absolute seriousness of purpose and refusal of astonishment-dandyism is the opposite of that camp sensibility so attuned to the contemporary world.
Whereas that other, more famous artifact of the Parisian boulevards, the flanuer, took pleasure in the forms of modern life by shopping, sampling, tasting, and enjoying the Pressionist stream of modern humanity,while also poised to offer automous critique,the dandy retreated from this historically modern form of the deployment of tastes and tought back to older, aristocratic forms of private collecting. No more perfect example of ressentiment toward to spectacle of democratized and commodified life offered by vulgarized (modern) paris can be found than that of the brothers Edmond and jules de Goncourt. Hybrid products of both the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie – a mother in one camp, a father in the other – Edmon and jules took nostalgia to new heights with their desire to return to the “good old days” of Louis 15 (1715 – 1774). The historian Deborah Silverman describes the brothers as “resentful and bitter children of the nineteenth century” who “considered themselves born too late to enjoy the effervescent leisure and langorous sensuality that noble elites had enjoyed during the era of the fetes galantes” (silverman, 1989). Deter mined to escape their historical fate, the Goncourts devoted themselves to collecting not only the art the fetes galantes, but olso the minutiae of the period, so as to entirely surround themselves in its latent ambience and make their rethreat to aristocratic private fantasy as complete as possible. They housed themselves and their memorabilia in a vast Parisian mansion, creating an eighteenth-century “world” where they could live “completely surrounded by vestiges of a lost aristocratic culture” (ibid), like Elvis fans on the path to re-create the state of grace in Graceland. Here, as Edmond noted, he could “open his eyes not on the era I ab-hor, but on the era that is a object of my studies and the love of my life” (ibid).
Although the Goncourts clearly would appear camp to anyone with a camp sensibility (as does Marcel Proust`s Baron de Charlus with his aristocratic fragrance and personal fragrance), in their refusal of the ordinary, their cold aestheticism, and their contempt foe the crowd (again, Charlus), the Goncourts sought to be the opposite of what after them became camp. Indeed, the camp sensibility, most clearly conceptualized vis-à-vis a family of interrelated yet distinctive concepts, might be called dandyism remade under the sign of middle-class consumerism, wich permits the camper to sample, look, buy, and return, as well as to find, invent, and collect. Camp allies itself with vulgarity and hence with democracy and mass production comuted into style and the idiosyncratic. In is fascination with the world of products, it allies itself with the flanuer, but in its refusal to be astonished by the values of the age and to submit to the flow of what is considered natural, it allies itself with the dandy. Indeed, the camper is a hybrid of these two historically given types and it is not fortuitous tha although the origin of camp resides in the Parisian dandy, the apotheosis of the type is found in America, land of shopping and the love of the low par excellence. Camp aims for reversal” the reversal of the values of high and low, straight and gay, male and female, sacred and profance, beautiful and vulgar, eternal and momentary, and Parisians with taste for reversal (if not for cross-dressing) tend either to remain dandies (of the Charlus type) or to fixate on the uncanniness of the ordinaire and become Surrealists. In its reversal of values, camp also has its cognate in the phenomenon of kitsch. Yet kitsch contains the message of genuine valuation, altouhg through the medium of the tacky, the simulated, and the tasteless, whereas camp revels in precisely that tastelessness through which kitsch voices it genuine aspiration.
As Susan Sontag says, “the ultimate camp statement: it`s good because it`s awful” (sontag, 1961). For camp, culture is wonderful precisely because it can be regarded apart from all serious intention: as a world of products, detritus, and the florid. We are singing in the wasteland, and it is no accident that camp is deeply connected to certain regions of Pop Art as well as postmodernism, finding its apotheosis in the Andy Warhol persona for whom the museum was a mere prototype for the shopping center. As Bloomingdales`s would replace the Museum of Modern Art, and the cult of the celebrity that of the artist, so Warhol would replace Proust, and camp, the dandy.
Essential to camp is pleasure taken in displacement: the displacement of good works into mere prduct values or floridated styles, of instincts into symptoms, of the erotic into childlike, of the gay into the closet: for, if essential to camp is its refusal of the attitudes of seriousness and passion, it is natural that this refusal be overdetermined in Sigmund freud`s sense and the happy camper may be the one who is uncomfortable in his instincts, just as his predecessor the dandy was uncomfortable with being astonished by the spontaneity of the modern world. It is here, perhaps, that Sontag`s combination of attraction and repulsion to camp (“I am strongly drawn to Camp, and almost as strongly offended by it”) finds its origin. The dandy`s prideful refusal or onability to abandon himself to the reception of life is met by the refusalor inability of the camp personality to submit to the flow of his own instinct. In his enjoyment of denigration can perhaps be seen either the traces of unconscious masochism or the projection of a debased self-image onto the world. The aesthetics of camp pleasure, therefore, contain a kernel of (perhaps unconscious) pain. From the point of view of commodities, the “Lebenscamper” no doubt exercises his or her free capacity for autonomy by taking pleasure in the fetish of capital. But this fetishization also has its roots in the camper`s own fear of the world of real human identity residing below that of commodity. It is inevitable that the American camper of genius, Andy Warhol, remained aloof from sex and commitment behind the dark glasses of his camp-creative genius. One might ask: what kind of freedom is this? Put another way, one might ask wether, at the basis of camp, is not an underlying melodrama of the unexpressed person who cannot or will notallow “instincts” spontaneous flow or working through. Perhaps there is something in the contemporary thought that camp has been the vehicle for the expression of ah otherness (in taste, sexual proclivity, or personal identity generally( that has been historically unable to speak its name. although certain postmodern theorists of resistance have attempted to find in the camp sensibility a germ of resistance politics, it is evident that the pleasure camp takes in indifference to serious self-assertion precludes ones`s making too much of this thought. It is expressive, yet veiled. One might ask what kind of freedom there is even in that form of indirect self-gesturing. Enough to build a life on? That is question on which a truly “post-kantian” critique of campian freedom can be founded. What, in the end, is the aesthetics of freedom? Of course, in a high falsetto, or in a blond wig, or with an impatient flap of manicured nails, camp would consign this question to the dustbin of high serious ness.
From Encyclopedia of Aesthetic volume 1, by Michael Kelly. Oxford university press. New York 1998
Menurut Susan Sontag, camp adalah memuja masa lalu
, meskipun masa lalu bukanlah satu-satunya inspirasi, hubungannya dengan masa lalu bersifat sentimentil.
Camp adalah satu model `fenomena estetisme', di mana estetik bukan dalam pengertian
keindahan atau keharmonisan, melainkan dalam pengertian kesemuan dan `penggayaan'
yang dicirikan oleh upaya-upaya melakukan sesuatu yang luar biasa, berlebihan, glamour,
dan menjanjikan kesemuan sebagai model estetika. Menurut Pilliang (2003) camp
menyanjung tinggi kevulgaran, tidak begitu tertarik pada sesuatu yang otentik atau
orisinil, namun lebih kepada duplikasi dari apa-apa yang telah ditemukan untuk tujuan
dan kepentingannya sendiri. Camp adalah satu bentuk yang mempunyai pengertian
`menghasilkan sesuatu dari apa-apa yang sudah tersedia
. Sebagai satu bentuk seni, camp menekankan dekorasi, tekstur, permukaan sensual, dan gaya, dengan mengorbankan isi.
Camp bersifat anti alamiah. Objek-objek alam, manusia, dan binatang kerap digunakan
namun secara ekstrim dideformasi; dibuat lebih kurus,ramping, jangkung atau secaraekstrim dibuat lebih gendut, besar atau lebar. Salah satu contoh keartifisialan tentang hal ini dapat ditemui pada beberapa karya Art Nouveau dengan bentuk-bentuk tubuh yang panjang, yang bak melambai pada cetakan dan lukisan Beardsley, atau bentuk-bentuk
dekoratif dan asimetri pada karya Guimard, Gaudi, dan Tiffani.
Notes On "Camp"
by Susan Sontag
Published in 1964.
Many things in the world have not been named; and many things, even if they have been named, have never been described. One of these is the sensibility -- unmistakably modern, a variant of sophistication but hardly identical with it -- that goes by the cult name of "Camp."
A sensibility (as distinct from an idea) is one of the hardest things to talk about; but there are special reasons why Camp, in particular, has never been discussed. It is not a natural mode of sensibility, if there be any such. Indeed the essence of Camp is its love of the unnatural: of artifice and exaggeration. And Camp is esoteric -- something of a private code, a badge of identity even, among small urban cliques. Apart from a lazy two-page sketch in Christopher Isherwood's novel The World in the Evening (1954), it has hardly broken into print. To talk about Camp is therefore to betray it. If the betrayal can be defended, it will be for the edification it provides, or the dignity of the conflict it resolves. For myself, I plead the goal of self-edification, and the goad of a sharp conflict in my own sensibility. I am strongly drawn to Camp, and almost as strongly offended by it. That is why I want to talk about it, and why I can. For no one who wholeheartedly shares in a given sensibility can analyze it; he can only, whatever his intention, exhibit it. To name a sensibility, to draw its contours and to recount its history, requires a deep sympathy modified by revulsion.
Though I am speaking about sensibility only -- and about a sensibility that, among other things, converts the serious into the frivolous -- these are grave matters. Most people think of sensibility or taste as the realm of purely subjective preferences, those mysterious attractions, mainly sensual, that have not been brought under the sovereignty of reason. They allow that considerations of taste play a part in their reactions to people and to works of art. But this attitude is naïve. And even worse. To patronize the faculty of taste is to patronize oneself. For taste governs every free -- as opposed to rote -- human response. Nothing is more decisive. There is taste in people, visual taste, taste in emotion - and there is taste in acts, taste in morality. Intelligence, as well, is really a kind of taste: taste in ideas. (One of the facts to be reckoned with is that taste tends to develop very unevenly. It's rare that the same person has good visual taste and good taste in people and taste in ideas.)
Taste has no system and no proofs. But there is something like a logic of taste: the consistent sensibility which underlies and gives rise to a certain taste. A sensibility is almost, but not quite, ineffable. Any sensibility which can be crammed into the mold of a system, or handled with the rough tools of proof, is no longer a sensibility at all. It has hardened into an idea . . .
To snare a sensibility in words, especially one that is alive and powerful,1 one must be tentative and nimble. The form of jottings, rather than an essay (with its claim to a linear, consecutive argument), seemed more appropriate for getting down something of this particular fugitive sensibility. It's embarrassing to be solemn and treatise-like about Camp. One runs the risk of having, oneself, produced a very inferior piece of Camp.
These notes are for Oscar Wilde.
"One should either be a work of art, or wear a work of art."
- Phrases & Philosophies for the Use of the Young
1. To start very generally: Camp is a certain mode of aestheticism. It is one way of seeing the world as an aesthetic phenomenon. That way, the way of Camp, is not in terms of beauty, but in terms of the degree of artifice, of stylization.
2. To emphasize style is to slight content, or to introduce an attitude which is neutral with respect to content. It goes without saying that the Camp sensibility is disengaged, depoliticized -- or at least apolitical.
3. Not only is there a Camp vision, a Camp way of looking at things. Camp is as well a quality discoverable in objects and the behavior of persons. There are "campy" movies, clothes, furniture, popular songs, novels, people, buildings. . . . This distinction is important. True, the Camp eye has the power to transform experience. But not everything can be seen as Camp. It's not all in the eye of the beholder.
4. Random examples of items which are part of the canon of Camp:
Zuleika Dobson
Tiffany lamps
Scopitone films
The Brown Derby restaurant on Sunset Boulevard in LA
The Enquirer, headlines and stories
Aubrey Beardsley drawings
Swan Lake
Bellini's operas
Visconti's direction of Salome and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore
certain turn-of-the-century picture postcards
Schoedsack's King Kong
the Cuban pop singer La Lupe
Lynn Ward's novel in woodcuts, God's Man
the old Flash Gordon comics
women's clothes of the twenties (feather boas, fringed and beaded dresses, etc.)
the novels of Ronald Firbank and Ivy Compton-Burnett
stag movies seen without lust
5. Camp taste has an affinity for certain arts rather than others. Clothes, furniture, all the elements of visual décor, for instance, make up a large part of Camp. For Camp art is often decorative art, emphasizing texture, sensuous surface, and style at the expense of content. Concert music, though, because it is contentless, is rarely Camp. It offers no opportunity, say, for a contrast between silly or extravagant content and rich form. . . . Sometimes whole art forms become saturated with Camp. Classical ballet, opera, movies have seemed so for a long time. In the last two years, popular music (post rock-'n'-roll, what the French call yé yé) has been annexed. And movie criticism (like lists of "The 10 Best Bad Movies I Have Seen") is probably the greatest popularizer of Camp taste today, because most people still go to the movies in a high-spirited and unpretentious way.
6. There is a sense in which it is correct to say: "It's too good to be Camp." Or "too important," not marginal enough. (More on this later.) Thus, the personality and many of the works of Jean Cocteau are Camp, but not those of André Gide; the operas of Richard Strauss, but not those of Wagner; concoctions of Tin Pan Alley and Liverpool, but not jazz. Many examples of Camp are things which, from a "serious" point of view, are either bad art or kitsch. Not all, though. Not only is Camp not necessarily bad art, but some art which can be approached as Camp (example: the major films of Louis Feuillade) merits the most serious admiration and study.
"The more we study Art, the less we care for Nature."
- The Decay of Lying
7. All Camp objects, and persons, contain a large element of artifice. Nothing in nature can be campy . . . Rural Camp is still man-made, and most campy objects are urban. (Yet, they often have a serenity -- or a naiveté -- which is the equivalent of pastoral. A great deal of Camp suggests Empson's phrase, "urban pastoral.")
8. Camp is a vision of the world in terms of style -- but a particular kind of style. It is the love of the exaggerated, the "off," of things-being-what-they-are-not. The best example is in Art Nouveau, the most typical and fully developed Camp style. Art Nouveau objects, typically, convert one thing into something else: the lighting fixtures in the form of flowering plants, the living room which is really a grotto. A remarkable example: the Paris Métro entrances designed by Hector Guimard in the late 1890s in the shape of cast-iron orchid stalks.
9. As a taste in persons, Camp responds particularly to the markedly attenuated and to the strongly exaggerated. The androgyne is certainly one of the great images of Camp sensibility. Examples: the swooning, slim, sinuous figures of pre-Raphaelite painting and poetry; the thin, flowing, sexless bodies in Art Nouveau prints and posters, presented in relief on lamps and ashtrays; the haunting androgynous vacancy behind the perfect beauty of Greta Garbo. Here, Camp taste draws on a mostly unacknowledged truth of taste: the most refined form of sexual attractiveness (as well as the most refined form of sexual pleasure) consists in going against the grain of one's sex. What is most beautiful in virile men is something feminine; what is most beautiful in feminine women is something masculine. . . . Allied to the Camp taste for the androgynous is something that seems quite different but isn't: a relish for the exaggeration of sexual characteristics and personality mannerisms. For obvious reasons, the best examples that can be cited are movie stars. The corny flamboyant female-ness of Jayne Mansfield, Gina Lollobrigida, Jane Russell, Virginia Mayo; the exaggerated he-man-ness of Steve Reeves, Victor Mature. The great stylists of temperament and mannerism, like Bette Davis, Barbara Stanwyck, Tallulah Bankhead, Edwige Feuillière.
10. Camp sees everything in quotation marks. It's not a lamp, but a "lamp"; not a woman, but a "woman." To perceive Camp in objects and persons is to understand Being-as-Playing-a-Role. It is the farthest extension, in sensibility, of the metaphor of life as theater.
11. Camp is the triumph of the epicene style. (The convertibility of "man" and "woman," "person" and "thing.") But all style, that is, artifice, is, ultimately, epicene. Life is not stylish. Neither is nature.
12. The question isn't, "Why travesty, impersonation, theatricality?" The question is, rather, "When does travesty, impersonation, theatricality acquire the special flavor of Camp?" Why is the atmosphere of Shakespeare's comedies (As You Like It, etc.) not epicene, while that of Der Rosenkavalier is?
13. The dividing line seems to fall in the 18th century; there the origins of Camp taste are to be found (Gothic novels, Chinoiserie, caricature, artificial ruins, and so forth.) But the relation to nature was quite different then. In the 18th century, people of taste either patronized nature (Strawberry Hill) or attempted to remake it into something artificial (Versailles). They also indefatigably patronized the past. Today's Camp taste effaces nature, or else contradicts it outright. And the relation of Camp taste to the past is extremely sentimental.
14. A pocket history of Camp might, of course, begin farther back -- with the mannerist artists like Pontormo, Rosso, and Caravaggio, or the extraordinarily theatrical painting of Georges de La Tour, or Euphuism (Lyly, etc.) in literature. Still, the soundest starting point seems to be the late 17th and early 18th century, because of that period's extraordinary feeling for artifice, for surface, for symmetry; its taste for the picturesque and the thrilling, its elegant conventions for representing instant feeling and the total presence of character -- the epigram and the rhymed couplet (in words), the flourish (in gesture and in music). The late 17th and early 18th century is the great period of Camp: Pope, Congreve, Walpole, etc, but not Swift; les précieux in France; the rococo churches of Munich; Pergolesi. Somewhat later: much of Mozart. But in the 19th century, what had been distributed throughout all of high culture now becomes a special taste; it takes on overtones of the acute, the esoteric, the perverse. Confining the story to England alone, we see Camp continuing wanly through 19th century aestheticism (Bume-Jones, Pater, Ruskin, Tennyson), emerging full-blown with the Art Nouveau movement in the visual and decorative arts, and finding its conscious ideologists in such "wits" as Wilde and Firbank.
15. Of course, to say all these things are Camp is not to argue they are simply that. A full analysis of Art Nouveau, for instance, would scarcely equate it with Camp. But such an analysis cannot ignore what in Art Nouveau allows it to be experienced as Camp. Art Nouveau is full of "content," even of a political-moral sort; it was a revolutionary movement in the arts, spurred on by a Utopian vision (somewhere between William Morris and the Bauhaus group) of an organic politics and taste. Yet there is also a feature of the Art Nouveau objects which suggests a disengaged, unserious, "aesthete's" vision. This tells us something important about Art Nouveau -- and about what the lens of Camp, which blocks out content, is.
16. Thus, the Camp sensibility is one that is alive to a double sense in which some things can be taken. But this is not the familiar split-level construction of a literal meaning, on the one hand, and a symbolic meaning, on the other. It is the difference, rather, between the thing as meaning something, anything, and the thing as pure artifice.
17. This comes out clearly in the vulgar use of the word Camp as a verb, "to camp," something that people do. To camp is a mode of seduction -- one which employs flamboyant mannerisms susceptible of a double interpretation; gestures full of duplicity, with a witty meaning for cognoscenti and another, more impersonal, for outsiders. Equally and by extension, when the word becomes a noun, when a person or a thing is "a camp," a duplicity is involved. Behind the "straight" public sense in which something can be taken, one has found a private zany experience of the thing.
"To be natural is such a very difficult pose to keep up."
- An Ideal Husband
18. One must distinguish between naïve and deliberate Camp. Pure Camp is always naive. Camp which knows itself to be Camp ("camping") is usually less satisfying.
19. The pure examples of Camp are unintentional; they are dead serious. The Art Nouveau craftsman who makes a lamp with a snake coiled around it is not kidding, nor is he trying to be charming. He is saying, in all earnestness: Voilà! the Orient! Genuine Camp -- for instance, the numbers devised for the Warner Brothers musicals of the early thirties (42nd Street; The Golddiggers of 1933; ... of 1935; ... of 1937; etc.) by Busby Berkeley -- does not mean to be funny. Camping -- say, the plays of Noel Coward -- does. It seems unlikely that much of the traditional opera repertoire could be such satisfying Camp if the melodramatic absurdities of most opera plots had not been taken seriously by their composers. One doesn't need to know the artist's private intentions. The work tells all. (Compare a typical 19th century opera with Samuel Barber's Vanessa, a piece of manufactured, calculated Camp, and the difference is clear.)
20. Probably, intending to be campy is always harmful. The perfection of Trouble in Paradise and The Maltese Falcon, among the greatest Camp movies ever made, comes from the effortless smooth way in which tone is maintained. This is not so with such famous would-be Camp films of the fifties as All About Eve and Beat the Devil. These more recent movies have their fine moments, but the first is so slick and the second so hysterical; they want so badly to be campy that they're continually losing the beat. . . . Perhaps, though, it is not so much a question of the unintended effect versus the conscious intention, as of the delicate relation between parody and self-parody in Camp. The films of Hitchcock are a showcase for this problem. When self-parody lacks ebullience but instead reveals (even sporadically) a contempt for one's themes and one's materials - as in To Catch a Thief, Rear Window, North by Northwest -- the results are forced and heavy-handed, rarely Camp. Successful Camp -- a movie like Carné's Drôle de Drame; the film performances of Mae West and Edward Everett Horton; portions of the Goon Show -- even when it reveals self-parody, reeks of self-love.
21. So, again, Camp rests on innocence. That means Camp discloses innocence, but also, when it can, corrupts it. Objects, being objects, don't change when they are singled out by the Camp vision. Persons, however, respond to their audiences. Persons begin "camping": Mae West, Bea Lillie, La Lupe, Tallulah Bankhead in Lifeboat, Bette Davis in All About Eve. (Persons can even be induced to camp without their knowing it. Consider the way Fellini got Anita Ekberg to parody herself in La Dolce Vita.)
22. Considered a little less strictly, Camp is either completely naive or else wholly conscious (when one plays at being campy). An example of the latter: Wilde's epigrams themselves.
"It's absurd to divide people into good and bad. People are either charming or tedious."
- Lady Windemere's Fan
23. In naïve, or pure, Camp, the essential element is seriousness, a seriousness that fails. Of course, not all seriousness that fails can be redeemed as Camp. Only that which has the proper mixture of the exaggerated, the fantastic, the passionate, and the naïve.
24. When something is just bad (rather than Camp), it's often because it is too mediocre in its ambition. The artist hasn't attempted to do anything really outlandish. ("It's too much," "It's too fantastic," "It's not to be believed," are standard phrases of Camp enthusiasm.)
25. The hallmark of Camp is the spirit of extravagance. Camp is a woman walking around in a dress made of three million feathers. Camp is the paintings of Carlo Crivelli, with their real jewels and trompe-l'oeil insects and cracks in the masonry. Camp is the outrageous aestheticism of Steinberg's six American movies with Dietrich, all six, but especially the last, The Devil Is a Woman. . . . In Camp there is often something démesuré in the quality of the ambition, not only in the style of the work itself. Gaudí's lurid and beautiful buildings in Barcelona are Camp not only because of their style but because they reveal -- most notably in the Cathedral of the Sagrada Familia -- the ambition on the part of one man to do what it takes a generation, a whole culture to accomplish.
26. Camp is art that proposes itself seriously, but cannot be taken altogether seriously because it is "too much." Titus Andronicus and Strange Interlude are almost Camp, or could be played as Camp. The public manner and rhetoric of de Gaulle, often, are pure Camp.
27. A work can come close to Camp, but not make it, because it succeeds. Eisenstein's films are seldom Camp because, despite all exaggeration, they do succeed (dramatically) without surplus. If they were a little more "off," they could be great Camp - particularly Ivan the Terrible I & II. The same for Blake's drawings and paintings, weird and mannered as they are. They aren't Camp; though Art Nouveau, influenced by Blake, is.
What is extravagant in an inconsistent or an unpassionate way is not Camp. Neither can anything be Camp that does not seem to spring from an irrepressible, a virtually uncontrolled sensibility. Without passion, one gets pseudo-Camp -- what is merely decorative, safe, in a word, chic. On the barren edge of Camp lie a number of attractive things: the sleek fantasies of Dali, the haute couture preciosity of Albicocco's The Girl with the Golden Eyes. But the two things - Camp and preciosity - must not be confused.
28. Again, Camp is the attempt to do something extraordinary. But extraordinary in the sense, often, of being special, glamorous. (The curved line, the extravagant gesture.) Not extraordinary merely in the sense of effort. Ripley's Believe-It-Or-Not items are rarely campy. These items, either natural oddities (the two-headed rooster, the eggplant in the shape of a cross) or else the products of immense labor (the man who walked from here to China on his hands, the woman who engraved the New Testament on the head of a pin), lack the visual reward - the glamour, the theatricality - that marks off certain extravagances as Camp.
29. The reason a movie like On the Beach, books like Winesburg, Ohio and For Whom the Bell Tolls are bad to the point of being laughable, but not bad to the point of being enjoyable, is that they are too dogged and pretentious. They lack fantasy. There is Camp in such bad movies as The Prodigal and Samson and Delilah, the series of Italian color spectacles featuring the super-hero Maciste, numerous Japanese science fiction films (Rodan, The Mysterians, The H-Man) because, in their relative unpretentiousness and vulgarity, they are more extreme and irresponsible in their fantasy - and therefore touching and quite enjoyable.
30. Of course, the canon of Camp can change. Time has a great deal to do with it. Time may enhance what seems simply dogged or lacking in fantasy now because we are too close to it, because it resembles too closely our own everyday fantasies, the fantastic nature of which we don't perceive. We are better able to enjoy a fantasy as fantasy when it is not our own.
31. This is why so many of the objects prized by Camp taste are old-fashioned, out-of-date, démodé. It's not a love of the old as such. It's simply that the process of aging or deterioration provides the necessary detachment -- or arouses a necessary sympathy. When the theme is important, and contemporary, the failure of a work of art may make us indignant. Time can change that. Time liberates the work of art from moral relevance, delivering it over to the Camp sensibility. . . . Another effect: time contracts the sphere of banality. (Banality is, strictly speaking, always a category of the contemporary.) What was banal can, with the passage of time, become fantastic. Many people who listen with delight to the style of Rudy Vallee revived by the English pop group, The Temperance Seven, would have been driven up the wall by Rudy Vallee in his heyday.
Thus, things are campy, not when they become old - but when we become less involved in them, and can enjoy, instead of be frustrated by, the failure of the attempt. But the effect of time is unpredictable. Maybe Method acting (James Dean, Rod Steiger, Warren Beatty) will seem as Camp some day as Ruby Keeler's does now - or as Sarah Bernhardt's does, in the films she made at the end of her career. And maybe not.
32. Camp is the glorification of "character." The statement is of no importance - except, of course, to the person (Loie Fuller, Gaudí, Cecil B. De Mille, Crivelli, de Gaulle, etc.) who makes it. What the Camp eye appreciates is the unity, the force of the person. In every move the aging Martha Graham makes she's being Martha Graham, etc., etc. . . . This is clear in the case of the great serious idol of Camp taste, Greta Garbo. Garbo's incompetence (at the least, lack of depth) as an actress enhances her beauty. She's always herself.
33. What Camp taste responds to is "instant character" (this is, of course, very 18th century); and, conversely, what it is not stirred by is the sense of the development of character. Character is understood as a state of continual incandescence - a person being one, very intense thing. This attitude toward character is a key element of the theatricalization of experience embodied in the Camp sensibility. And it helps account for the fact that opera and ballet are experienced as such rich treasures of Camp, for neither of these forms can easily do justice to the complexity of human nature. Wherever there is development of character, Camp is reduced. Among operas, for example, La Traviata (which has some small development of character) is less campy than Il Trovatore (which has none).
"Life is too important a thing ever to talk seriously about it."
- Vera, or The Nihilists
34. Camp taste turns its back on the good-bad axis of ordinary aesthetic judgment. Camp doesn't reverse things. It doesn't argue that the good is bad, or the bad is good. What it does is to offer for art (and life) a different -- a supplementary -- set of standards.
35. Ordinarily we value a work of art because of the seriousness and dignity of what it achieves. We value it because it succeeds - in being what it is and, presumably, in fulfilling the intention that lies behind it. We assume a proper, that is to say, straightforward relation between intention and performance. By such standards, we appraise The Iliad, Aristophanes' plays, The Art of the Fugue, Middlemarch, the paintings of Rembrandt, Chartres, the poetry of Donne, The Divine Comedy, Beethoven's quartets, and - among people - Socrates, Jesus, St. Francis, Napoleon, Savonarola. In short, the pantheon of high culture: truth, beauty, and seriousness.
36. But there are other creative sensibilities besides the seriousness (both tragic and comic) of high culture and of the high style of evaluating people. And one cheats oneself, as a human being, if one has respect only for the style of high culture, whatever else one may do or feel on the sly.
For instance, there is the kind of seriousness whose trademark is anguish, cruelty, derangement. Here we do accept a disparity between intention and result. I am speaking, obviously, of a style of personal existence as well as of a style in art; but the examples had best come from art. Think of Bosch, Sade, Rimbaud, Jarry, Kafka, Artaud, think of most of the important works of art of the 20th century, that is, art whose goal is not that of creating harmonies but of overstraining the medium and introducing more and more violent, and unresolvable, subject-matter. This sensibility also insists on the principle that an oeuvre in the old sense (again, in art, but also in life) is not possible. Only "fragments" are possible. . . . Clearly, different standards apply here than to traditional high culture. Something is good not because it is achieved, but because another kind of truth about the human situation, another experience of what it is to be human - in short, another valid sensibility -- is being revealed.
And third among the great creative sensibilities is Camp: the sensibility of failed seriousness, of the theatricalization of experience. Camp refuses both the harmonies of traditional seriousness, and the risks of fully identifying with extreme states of feeling.
37. The first sensibility, that of high culture, is basically moralistic. The second sensibility, that of extreme states of feeling, represented in much contemporary "avant-garde" art, gains power by a tension between moral and aesthetic passion. The third, Camp, is wholly aesthetic.
38. Camp is the consistently aesthetic experience of the world. It incarnates a victory of "style" over "content," "aesthetics" over "morality," of irony over tragedy.
39. Camp and tragedy are antitheses. There is seriousness in Camp (seriousness in the degree of the artist's involvement) and, often, pathos. The excruciating is also one of the tonalities of Camp; it is the quality of excruciation in much of Henry James (for instance, The Europeans, The Awkward Age, The Wings of the Dove) that is responsible for the large element of Camp in his writings. But there is never, never tragedy.
40. Style is everything. Genet's ideas, for instance, are very Camp. Genet's statement that "the only criterion of an act is its elegance"2 is virtually interchangeable, as a statement, with Wilde's "in matters of great importance, the vital element is not sincerity, but style." But what counts, finally, is the style in which ideas are held. The ideas about morality and politics in, say, Lady Windemere's Fan and in Major Barbara are Camp, but not just because of the nature of the ideas themselves. It is those ideas, held in a special playful way. The Camp ideas in Our Lady of the Flowers are maintained too grimly, and the writing itself is too successfully elevated and serious, for Genet's books to be Camp.
41. The whole point of Camp is to dethrone the serious. Camp is playful, anti-serious. More precisely, Camp involves a new, more complex relation to "the serious." One can be serious about the frivolous, frivolous about the serious.
42. One is drawn to Camp when one realizes that "sincerity" is not enough. Sincerity can be simple philistinism, intellectual narrowness.
43. The traditional means for going beyond straight seriousness - irony, satire - seem feeble today, inadequate to the culturally oversaturated medium in which contemporary sensibility is schooled. Camp introduces a new standard: artifice as an ideal, theatricality.
44. Camp proposes a comic vision of the world. But not a bitter or polemical comedy. If tragedy is an experience of hyperinvolvement, comedy is an experience of underinvolvement, of detachment.
"I adore simple pleasures, they are the last refuge of the complex."
- A Woman of No Importance
45. Detachment is the prerogative of an elite; and as the dandy is the 19th century's surrogate for the aristocrat in matters of culture, so Camp is the modern dandyism. Camp is the answer to the problem: how to be a dandy in the age of mass culture.
46. The dandy was overbred. His posture was disdain, or else ennui. He sought rare sensations, undefiled by mass appreciation. (Models: Des Esseintes in Huysmans' À Rebours, Marius the Epicurean, Valéry's Monsieur Teste.) He was dedicated to "good taste."
The connoisseur of Camp has found more ingenious pleasures. Not in Latin poetry and rare wines and velvet jackets, but in the coarsest, commonest pleasures, in the arts of the masses. Mere use does not defile the objects of his pleasure, since he learns to possess them in a rare way. Camp -- Dandyism in the age of mass culture -- makes no distinction between the unique object and the mass-produced object. Camp taste transcends the nausea of the replica.
47. Wilde himself is a transitional figure. The man who, when he first came to London, sported a velvet beret, lace shirts, velveteen knee-breeches and black silk stockings, could never depart too far in his life from the pleasures of the old-style dandy; this conservatism is reflected in The Picture of Dorian Gray. But many of his attitudes suggest something more modern. It was Wilde who formulated an important element of the Camp sensibility -- the equivalence of all objects -- when he announced his intention of "living up" to his blue-and-white china, or declared that a doorknob could be as admirable as a painting. When he proclaimed the importance of the necktie, the boutonniere, the chair, Wilde was anticipating the democratic esprit of Camp.
48. The old-style dandy hated vulgarity. The new-style dandy, the lover of Camp, appreciates vulgarity. Where the dandy would be continually offended or bored, the connoisseur of Camp is continually amused, delighted. The dandy held a perfumed handkerchief to his nostrils and was liable to swoon; the connoisseur of Camp sniffs the stink and prides himself on his strong nerves.
49. It is a feat, of course. A feat goaded on, in the last analysis, by the threat of boredom. The relation between boredom and Camp taste cannot be overestimated. Camp taste is by its nature possible only in affluent societies, in societies or circles capable of experiencing the psychopathology of affluence.
"What is abnormal in Life stands in normal relations to Art. It is the only thing in Life that stands in normal relations to Art."
- A Few Maxims for the Instruction of the Over-Educated
50. Aristocracy is a position vis-à-vis culture (as well as vis-à-vis power), and the history of Camp taste is part of the history of snob taste. But since no authentic aristocrats in the old sense exist today to sponsor special tastes, who is the bearer of this taste? Answer: an improvised self-elected class, mainly homosexuals, who constitute themselves as aristocrats of taste.
51. The peculiar relation between Camp taste and homosexuality has to be explained. While it's not true that Camp taste is homosexual taste, there is no doubt a peculiar affinity and overlap. Not all liberals are Jews, but Jews have shown a peculiar affinity for liberal and reformist causes. So, not all homosexuals have Camp taste. But homosexuals, by and large, constitute the vanguard -- and the most articulate audience -- of Camp. (The analogy is not frivolously chosen. Jews and homosexuals are the outstanding creative minorities in contemporary urban culture. Creative, that is, in the truest sense: they are creators of sensibilities. The two pioneering forces of modern sensibility are Jewish moral seriousness and homosexual aestheticism and irony.)
52. The reason for the flourishing of the aristocratic posture among homosexuals also seems to parallel the Jewish case. For every sensibility is self-serving to the group that promotes it. Jewish liberalism is a gesture of self-legitimization. So is Camp taste, which definitely has something propagandistic about it. Needless to say, the propaganda operates in exactly the opposite direction. The Jews pinned their hopes for integrating into modern society on promoting the moral sense. Homosexuals have pinned their integration into society on promoting the aesthetic sense. Camp is a solvent of morality. It neutralizes moral indignation, sponsors playfulness.
53. Nevertheless, even though homosexuals have been its vanguard, Camp taste is much more than homosexual taste. Obviously, its metaphor of life as theater is peculiarly suited as a justification and projection of a certain aspect of the situation of homosexuals. (The Camp insistence on not being "serious," on playing, also connects with the homosexual's desire to remain youthful.) Yet one feels that if homosexuals hadn't more or less invented Camp, someone else would. For the aristocratic posture with relation to culture cannot die, though it may persist only in increasingly arbitrary and ingenious ways. Camp is (to repeat) the relation to style in a time in which the adoption of style -- as such -- has become altogether questionable. (In the modem era, each new style, unless frankly anachronistic, has come on the scene as an anti-style.)
"One must have a heart of stone to read the death of Little Nell without laughing."
- In conversation
54. The experiences of Camp are based on the great discovery that the sensibility of high culture has no monopoly upon refinement. Camp asserts that good taste is not simply good taste; that there exists, indeed, a good taste of bad taste. (Genet talks about this in Our Lady of the Flowers.) The discovery of the good taste of bad taste can be very liberating. The man who insists on high and serious pleasures is depriving himself of pleasure; he continually restricts what he can enjoy; in the constant exercise of his good taste he will eventually price himself out of the market, so to speak. Here Camp taste supervenes upon good taste as a daring and witty hedonism. It makes the man of good taste cheerful, where before he ran the risk of being chronically frustrated. It is good for the digestion.
55. Camp taste is, above all, a mode of enjoyment, of appreciation - not judgment. Camp is generous. It wants to enjoy. It only seems like malice, cynicism. (Or, if it is cynicism, it's not a ruthless but a sweet cynicism.) Camp taste doesn't propose that it is in bad taste to be serious; it doesn't sneer at someone who succeeds in being seriously dramatic. What it does is to find the success in certain passionate failures.
56. Camp taste is a kind of love, love for human nature. It relishes, rather than judges, the little triumphs and awkward intensities of "character." . . . Camp taste identifies with what it is enjoying. People who share this sensibility are not laughing at the thing they label as "a camp," they're enjoying it. Camp is a tender feeling.
(Here, one may compare Camp with much of Pop Art, which -- when it is not just Camp -- embodies an attitude that is related, but still very different. Pop Art is more flat and more dry, more serious, more detached, ultimately nihilistic.)
57. Camp taste nourishes itself on the love that has gone into certain objects and personal styles. The absence of this love is the reason why such kitsch items as Peyton Place (the book) and the Tishman Building aren't Camp.
58. The ultimate Camp statement: it's good because it's awful . . . Of course, one can't always say that. Only under certain conditions, those which I've tried to sketch in these notes.
CAMP
Camp may look simple in comparison to other artistic and cultural forms because its materials come from everyday world – the images, wigs, cosmetics, clothes, shoes, mascara, nail polish, labels, songs, fabrics, textures and shape of popular and high culture.
Have to be reworked and filtered trough the camp sensibility so that the quality of camp in them can be discovered seen. Indeed, the distinctively camp sensibility trough which such form are transmuted could only have emerged out of a complex history often glossed under the name of moderenity. Camp is an artifact of that modernity, the doppelganger of moderenist high seriousness, responding to that earnestness by resurre ecting artifice in place of art, and style in place of content. Historically specific,what this concept reveales is the essential historicity of aesthetic form. The “conditions for the possibility” of camp are in essence as complex as those of moderenity itself, requiring a fourth critique in the post – cantianvein of this most un-cantiansensibility. Let us call in the critique of pure camp, or , more succinctly the cxritique of upper new york as the territory of camp par excellent, and , appropriately, the place just below which camp received its first “serious” description in 1961 by susan sontag.
Camp is a way of life, a mode of embodiment in the modernt world of consumeristich societies, a mode of arranging preferences, deploying tastes , making judgements, attching oneself --- or failing to – to others, perhaps a politics but certainly an aesthetic in the fullest sense of this wored. Indeed, as a form of lebenskunsterism propelled by an indifference to all norms of quality, in its love of the déclassé , the ordinaire , the exaggerated , and the awful its match the free thingking and free living spirit of a don Giovanni, although , at the same time resolutely refusing his machismo in favor of a more :feminized” relation to shopping,. Testing, sampling. And trying on. The proof of life, one might say, resides in the fact of probare: of trying things on—the wigs, dark glasses , and mae west gestures , the bad movies , old costumes, and the colletage of an andy Warhol turned aging French chanteuse (heard, of course , over the radio on dark nights in the cellars of new york). It is this transposition of the deep emotionality of the chanteuse in to the pleasure of her voice, her dress, and her sageging face that converts the high seriousness of art in to the pleasures of its camping double, just as cantian morality becomes replaced in the world of camp by the taste for drag queens , overweight rockstars and old rageous clothes purchased at outrageously discount—or, conversely, outrageously over – the – top – prices
What is common to all this these acts, things , and behaviours, what makes them can in the first instance is the eradication of any traces of the “natural” in its broadest sense. Camp occludes those norms of the social world that have trough time, training, and custom become “naturalized,” the fetishization of capital that has taken on the appearance of the natural, and the inner instincts of love, work, and attachment that spontaneously arise in those who fall under the name of the human. This norms and instincts become for the camp sensibility the objects of this placement , the occasion for theatrical games that placed them under suspension and replace them with a love of the low, the florid, and the playful. In a pre-postmodern vein, camp celebrates the simulacrum , runs riot with the fetish of capital by harping on its essential unnaturalness—exploiting the commodification of live in a disneylad of the imagination. It turns its back on the very idea of authenticity , turning the avant-garde into an occasion for an all – night party were the “camper” can enjoyed his or her private form of outrageousness. Intstead of mourning the lost of reality , the crying, the instrumentalism of consumer society, and lamenting the commodification of the subject , camp pushes this “evils” to their limts, embraching the idea of artifice and artificiality. Iam only as good as my dye job , my liposuction , my manicure, my designer body , my plastic surgeon, my bank balance, an that is just fine. This is all that is worth seeing of me : the rest eye consigen to silence and the graveyard of grafity. Camp is a protection against the lost of real life, a real family, real feelings, real community. Because these are also the losses the arise out of the process of urbanization that are associated with big city life and all its concomitante evils and pleasures , camp is essentially a first- world , big- city phenomenon. It is difficult to imagine a camp sensibility existing in the developing world, although many of this products – especially those produced for the tourist market—appear camp to first- world travelers. Camp is the silver lining in the cloud of moderenity , the recipe for commuting modern disemchantment in to fun in games. It is thus unthinkable a part from the fact of moderenity.
The etymology of the term dates from the sixteenth century English where young men who wore the costumes of women in performance were described as “camping”, andpossibly also from the French word champagne, where theatrical troupes turning life on its head often performed. The term’s subsequent hisyory is obscure. What is clear is that by the early 1960s, when Susan Sontag’s locus classicus “Notes on Camp” was written, it was already a term enjoying a certain urban vogue. In deference to the ephemeral quality of the concept (what Charles Baudelaire might see as one-half of its modern character), Sontag eschews the linear essay from in favor of fifty-eight remarks or “jottings” tat attempt to outline camp as an aesthetic, vision, a quality projected onto objects and characteristic of certain people, a behavior (“to camp” as verb), and a pattern of taste. She outline three aesthetic attitudes and places came third,following on the sensibility of seriousness (which dominates tradisional high culture) and that of “anguish,cruelty,derangement,”which,according to here somewhat Ingmar bergemenesque view,dominates modernism.the first sensibility offers for our enjoyment the successful fulfillment of it’s aims,which susan sontag outlines as truth,beauty,and seriousness.on such a basis,we apprise and declare valuable such works as the paintings of Rembrandt van rijn,the music of wolfgang amadeusmozart the sonnets of William shakerspeare,and all the great works of the classical that we cherish and adore and that ate so difficult to turn into the objects of camping. The avant-garde, according to Sontag’s (somewhat questionable) idea, rejects truth and beauty,, but is valued for its very fragmentation of those ideals, andindeed for its violence, emotionality, and extremism (again, according to the Sontag of 1961). These two sensibilities for the possibility for the emergence of camp. Camp does not engage in opposional polemics against these other sensibilities (that would be an avant-garde stance) inasmuch as it ooffers an alternative of divine indifference to them: ignoring “both the harmonies of traditional seriousness, and the risk of fully identifying with extreme states of feeling” in favor of style and aesthetticization (Sontag, 1966, p. 287). One could not understand the concept and phenomenon of camp without first having the former sensibilities in place.
The hallmarks of camp taste are those already touched on-a love of artifice, decoration, style, the objects of the visual world, exaggeration, role playing, the cult of the personality, and extravagance. The motivations for camp are as complex and overdetermined as are the societies that provide its mise-en-scene. For Sontag, “the relation between boredom and Camp taste cannot be overestimated” (ibid). In a penetrating and original display of moderenist sensibility directed toward the play that is camp, she describes camp as a “ feat goaded on , in the last analysis, by the treat of the boredom” (ibid). because to be bored implies a certain leisure and hence a certain degree of wealth, she concludes that camp only occurs in “societies or circles capable of experiencing the pyshcopathology of affluence” (ibid). writing years ahead of her time, she also recognizes in camp implicite of an identity politics as yet unable to voice its name and speaks of camps tendensi to reverse classical and avant-grade norms and its excessive attachment to stylization as encouding the desert of certain groups for self – legitimization. A sensibility, sontag notes, often perform this function (it is for this reason that one may speak of it as expressive). With its sense of theatricalization and play, camp is often seen as a gay (sontag use the term homosexual) sensibility- one that, in thumbing its nose at conventional morality, seeks to overcome the barriers of “the norm” and one that contain more then a hint of gender reversal and cross-dressing. Yet, despitr its strong association with gay men, camp taste , she notes is not equivalent to “gay taste” (first because there is no essentializable quantity, and second because the domain of the happy camper is a straight as well as a gay domain, just as it is both male and female one). Sontag also finds a suprising kind of humanity in the camp sensibility, a general city and kindness toward the human condition that comes from its refusal of established hirerarchies of taste and its love of the overlooked, the idiosyncratic and the ordinaire. Indeed, sontag insists that camps nastiness (perhaps bitchiness is a more appropriate word) is its mode of identification rather than high-handed (I.e., modernists) judgment (people who share this sensibility are not laughing at the thing they label as “a camp,” they are enjoying it. “Camp is a tender feeling” (sontag, 1961, p. 292; emphasis in original). Here lies the difference between being camp and being dandified-a difference that Sontag begins briefly to outline (“the dandy overbred. His posture was disdain or ennui”) and that will be explored here in more detail.
The historical conditions that conspire to make camp possible, namely, those of modernity itself, must be taken more seriously than Sontag did. To glean this point, one should turn to the prefigurement of the camp sensibility in that artifact og nineteenth-century bourgeois consumerism-the dandy. Sontag describes camp as modernity`s answer for the masses to the designer outfit, so the camp personality is a way to be a dandy in the “age of mass culture.” In contrast, the dandy of the nineteenth century was a product of the elite, a man who, in Baudelaire`s words, “has been brought up amid luxury and has been accustomed since his earliest days to the obedience of others” (Baudelaire, 1946). In this case, the use of the masculine pronoun to describe dandyism is intentional because the concept is strictly limited to men only; for, despite its emphasis on grooming and the toilette, an clothes, etiquette, self-presentation, the collection of beautiful objects, and the dedication to pleasure, leisure, and affairs of the heart, dandyism was for the hypermasculine, analogous to, in the words of Baudelaire, “the strictest monastic order” (ibid). despite attention to what might be considered the trivia of life, Beudelaire insist that dandyism was impelled by a need to fight and eradicate triviality. From this need, he argues, sprang the dany`s haughtiness, his rejection of the ordinary and the base, his love of the heroic gesture, and above all, his coldness:”Dandyism is a sunset: like the decliningdaystar it is without heat and full of melancholy” (ibid).
In his contempt for the “vulgarity” of contemporary life, egendered by the Paris of the nineteenth century with its rising bourgeois class, its democratizion of taste, and its creation of the spectacle of Parisian shopping and Parisian display, the dandy looked back to the past, even as far back as to the antique past of Julius Caesar, in order to invent a “new” aristocracy and liniage for himself. In its coldness, its love of a romantic invented past, its refusal to be defiled by the ordinary present, its exclusivity and dedication to privilege and the “duties” that attend such a station-in other words, in its absolute seriousness of purpose and refusal of astonishment-dandyism is the opposite of that camp sensibility so attuned to the contemporary world.
Whereas that other, more famous artifact of the Parisian boulevards, the flanuer, took pleasure in the forms of modern life by shopping, sampling, tasting, and enjoying the Pressionist stream of modern humanity,while also poised to offer automous critique,the dandy retreated from this historically modern form of the deployment of tastes and tought back to older, aristocratic forms of private collecting. No more perfect example of ressentiment toward to spectacle of democratized and commodified life offered by vulgarized (modern) paris can be found than that of the brothers Edmond and jules de Goncourt. Hybrid products of both the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie – a mother in one camp, a father in the other – Edmon and jules took nostalgia to new heights with their desire to return to the “good old days” of Louis 15 (1715 – 1774). The historian Deborah Silverman describes the brothers as “resentful and bitter children of the nineteenth century” who “considered themselves born too late to enjoy the effervescent leisure and langorous sensuality that noble elites had enjoyed during the era of the fetes galantes” (silverman, 1989). Deter mined to escape their historical fate, the Goncourts devoted themselves to collecting not only the art the fetes galantes, but olso the minutiae of the period, so as to entirely surround themselves in its latent ambience and make their rethreat to aristocratic private fantasy as complete as possible. They housed themselves and their memorabilia in a vast Parisian mansion, creating an eighteenth-century “world” where they could live “completely surrounded by vestiges of a lost aristocratic culture” (ibid), like Elvis fans on the path to re-create the state of grace in Graceland. Here, as Edmond noted, he could “open his eyes not on the era I ab-hor, but on the era that is a object of my studies and the love of my life” (ibid).
Although the Goncourts clearly would appear camp to anyone with a camp sensibility (as does Marcel Proust`s Baron de Charlus with his aristocratic fragrance and personal fragrance), in their refusal of the ordinary, their cold aestheticism, and their contempt foe the crowd (again, Charlus), the Goncourts sought to be the opposite of what after them became camp. Indeed, the camp sensibility, most clearly conceptualized vis-à-vis a family of interrelated yet distinctive concepts, might be called dandyism remade under the sign of middle-class consumerism, wich permits the camper to sample, look, buy, and return, as well as to find, invent, and collect. Camp allies itself with vulgarity and hence with democracy and mass production comuted into style and the idiosyncratic. In is fascination with the world of products, it allies itself with the flanuer, but in its refusal to be astonished by the values of the age and to submit to the flow of what is considered natural, it allies itself with the dandy. Indeed, the camper is a hybrid of these two historically given types and it is not fortuitous tha although the origin of camp resides in the Parisian dandy, the apotheosis of the type is found in America, land of shopping and the love of the low par excellence. Camp aims for reversal” the reversal of the values of high and low, straight and gay, male and female, sacred and profance, beautiful and vulgar, eternal and momentary, and Parisians with taste for reversal (if not for cross-dressing) tend either to remain dandies (of the Charlus type) or to fixate on the uncanniness of the ordinaire and become Surrealists. In its reversal of values, camp also has its cognate in the phenomenon of kitsch. Yet kitsch contains the message of genuine valuation, altouhg through the medium of the tacky, the simulated, and the tasteless, whereas camp revels in precisely that tastelessness through which kitsch voices it genuine aspiration.
As Susan Sontag says, “the ultimate camp statement: it`s good because it`s awful” (sontag, 1961). For camp, culture is wonderful precisely because it can be regarded apart from all serious intention: as a world of products, detritus, and the florid. We are singing in the wasteland, and it is no accident that camp is deeply connected to certain regions of Pop Art as well as postmodernism, finding its apotheosis in the Andy Warhol persona for whom the museum was a mere prototype for the shopping center. As Bloomingdales`s would replace the Museum of Modern Art, and the cult of the celebrity that of the artist, so Warhol would replace Proust, and camp, the dandy.
Essential to camp is pleasure taken in displacement: the displacement of good works into mere prduct values or floridated styles, of instincts into symptoms, of the erotic into childlike, of the gay into the closet: for, if essential to camp is its refusal of the attitudes of seriousness and passion, it is natural that this refusal be overdetermined in Sigmund freud`s sense and the happy camper may be the one who is uncomfortable in his instincts, just as his predecessor the dandy was uncomfortable with being astonished by the spontaneity of the modern world. It is here, perhaps, that Sontag`s combination of attraction and repulsion to camp (“I am strongly drawn to Camp, and almost as strongly offended by it”) finds its origin. The dandy`s prideful refusal or onability to abandon himself to the reception of life is met by the refusalor inability of the camp personality to submit to the flow of his own instinct. In his enjoyment of denigration can perhaps be seen either the traces of unconscious masochism or the projection of a debased self-image onto the world. The aesthetics of camp pleasure, therefore, contain a kernel of (perhaps unconscious) pain. From the point of view of commodities, the “Lebenscamper” no doubt exercises his or her free capacity for autonomy by taking pleasure in the fetish of capital. But this fetishization also has its roots in the camper`s own fear of the world of real human identity residing below that of commodity. It is inevitable that the American camper of genius, Andy Warhol, remained aloof from sex and commitment behind the dark glasses of his camp-creative genius. One might ask: what kind of freedom is this? Put another way, one might ask wether, at the basis of camp, is not an underlying melodrama of the unexpressed person who cannot or will notallow “instincts” spontaneous flow or working through. Perhaps there is something in the contemporary thought that camp has been the vehicle for the expression of ah otherness (in taste, sexual proclivity, or personal identity generally( that has been historically unable to speak its name. although certain postmodern theorists of resistance have attempted to find in the camp sensibility a germ of resistance politics, it is evident that the pleasure camp takes in indifference to serious self-assertion precludes ones`s making too much of this thought. It is expressive, yet veiled. One might ask what kind of freedom there is even in that form of indirect self-gesturing. Enough to build a life on? That is question on which a truly “post-kantian” critique of campian freedom can be founded. What, in the end, is the aesthetics of freedom? Of course, in a high falsetto, or in a blond wig, or with an impatient flap of manicured nails, camp would consign this question to the dustbin of high serious ness.
From Encyclopedia of Aesthetic volume 1, by Michael Kelly. Oxford university press. New York 1998
Menurut Susan Sontag, camp adalah memuja masa lalu
, meskipun masa lalu bukanlah satu-satunya inspirasi, hubungannya dengan masa lalu bersifat sentimentil.
Camp adalah satu model `fenomena estetisme', di mana estetik bukan dalam pengertian
keindahan atau keharmonisan, melainkan dalam pengertian kesemuan dan `penggayaan'
yang dicirikan oleh upaya-upaya melakukan sesuatu yang luar biasa, berlebihan, glamour,
dan menjanjikan kesemuan sebagai model estetika. Menurut Pilliang (2003) camp
menyanjung tinggi kevulgaran, tidak begitu tertarik pada sesuatu yang otentik atau
orisinil, namun lebih kepada duplikasi dari apa-apa yang telah ditemukan untuk tujuan
dan kepentingannya sendiri. Camp adalah satu bentuk yang mempunyai pengertian
`menghasilkan sesuatu dari apa-apa yang sudah tersedia
. Sebagai satu bentuk seni, camp menekankan dekorasi, tekstur, permukaan sensual, dan gaya, dengan mengorbankan isi.
Camp bersifat anti alamiah. Objek-objek alam, manusia, dan binatang kerap digunakan
namun secara ekstrim dideformasi; dibuat lebih kurus,ramping, jangkung atau secaraekstrim dibuat lebih gendut, besar atau lebar. Salah satu contoh keartifisialan tentang hal ini dapat ditemui pada beberapa karya Art Nouveau dengan bentuk-bentuk tubuh yang panjang, yang bak melambai pada cetakan dan lukisan Beardsley, atau bentuk-bentuk
dekoratif dan asimetri pada karya Guimard, Gaudi, dan Tiffani.
Notes On "Camp"
by Susan Sontag
Published in 1964.
Many things in the world have not been named; and many things, even if they have been named, have never been described. One of these is the sensibility -- unmistakably modern, a variant of sophistication but hardly identical with it -- that goes by the cult name of "Camp."
A sensibility (as distinct from an idea) is one of the hardest things to talk about; but there are special reasons why Camp, in particular, has never been discussed. It is not a natural mode of sensibility, if there be any such. Indeed the essence of Camp is its love of the unnatural: of artifice and exaggeration. And Camp is esoteric -- something of a private code, a badge of identity even, among small urban cliques. Apart from a lazy two-page sketch in Christopher Isherwood's novel The World in the Evening (1954), it has hardly broken into print. To talk about Camp is therefore to betray it. If the betrayal can be defended, it will be for the edification it provides, or the dignity of the conflict it resolves. For myself, I plead the goal of self-edification, and the goad of a sharp conflict in my own sensibility. I am strongly drawn to Camp, and almost as strongly offended by it. That is why I want to talk about it, and why I can. For no one who wholeheartedly shares in a given sensibility can analyze it; he can only, whatever his intention, exhibit it. To name a sensibility, to draw its contours and to recount its history, requires a deep sympathy modified by revulsion.
Though I am speaking about sensibility only -- and about a sensibility that, among other things, converts the serious into the frivolous -- these are grave matters. Most people think of sensibility or taste as the realm of purely subjective preferences, those mysterious attractions, mainly sensual, that have not been brought under the sovereignty of reason. They allow that considerations of taste play a part in their reactions to people and to works of art. But this attitude is naïve. And even worse. To patronize the faculty of taste is to patronize oneself. For taste governs every free -- as opposed to rote -- human response. Nothing is more decisive. There is taste in people, visual taste, taste in emotion - and there is taste in acts, taste in morality. Intelligence, as well, is really a kind of taste: taste in ideas. (One of the facts to be reckoned with is that taste tends to develop very unevenly. It's rare that the same person has good visual taste and good taste in people and taste in ideas.)
Taste has no system and no proofs. But there is something like a logic of taste: the consistent sensibility which underlies and gives rise to a certain taste. A sensibility is almost, but not quite, ineffable. Any sensibility which can be crammed into the mold of a system, or handled with the rough tools of proof, is no longer a sensibility at all. It has hardened into an idea . . .
To snare a sensibility in words, especially one that is alive and powerful,1 one must be tentative and nimble. The form of jottings, rather than an essay (with its claim to a linear, consecutive argument), seemed more appropriate for getting down something of this particular fugitive sensibility. It's embarrassing to be solemn and treatise-like about Camp. One runs the risk of having, oneself, produced a very inferior piece of Camp.
These notes are for Oscar Wilde.
"One should either be a work of art, or wear a work of art."
- Phrases & Philosophies for the Use of the Young
1. To start very generally: Camp is a certain mode of aestheticism. It is one way of seeing the world as an aesthetic phenomenon. That way, the way of Camp, is not in terms of beauty, but in terms of the degree of artifice, of stylization.
2. To emphasize style is to slight content, or to introduce an attitude which is neutral with respect to content. It goes without saying that the Camp sensibility is disengaged, depoliticized -- or at least apolitical.
3. Not only is there a Camp vision, a Camp way of looking at things. Camp is as well a quality discoverable in objects and the behavior of persons. There are "campy" movies, clothes, furniture, popular songs, novels, people, buildings. . . . This distinction is important. True, the Camp eye has the power to transform experience. But not everything can be seen as Camp. It's not all in the eye of the beholder.
4. Random examples of items which are part of the canon of Camp:
Zuleika Dobson
Tiffany lamps
Scopitone films
The Brown Derby restaurant on Sunset Boulevard in LA
The Enquirer, headlines and stories
Aubrey Beardsley drawings
Swan Lake
Bellini's operas
Visconti's direction of Salome and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore
certain turn-of-the-century picture postcards
Schoedsack's King Kong
the Cuban pop singer La Lupe
Lynn Ward's novel in woodcuts, God's Man
the old Flash Gordon comics
women's clothes of the twenties (feather boas, fringed and beaded dresses, etc.)
the novels of Ronald Firbank and Ivy Compton-Burnett
stag movies seen without lust
5. Camp taste has an affinity for certain arts rather than others. Clothes, furniture, all the elements of visual décor, for instance, make up a large part of Camp. For Camp art is often decorative art, emphasizing texture, sensuous surface, and style at the expense of content. Concert music, though, because it is contentless, is rarely Camp. It offers no opportunity, say, for a contrast between silly or extravagant content and rich form. . . . Sometimes whole art forms become saturated with Camp. Classical ballet, opera, movies have seemed so for a long time. In the last two years, popular music (post rock-'n'-roll, what the French call yé yé) has been annexed. And movie criticism (like lists of "The 10 Best Bad Movies I Have Seen") is probably the greatest popularizer of Camp taste today, because most people still go to the movies in a high-spirited and unpretentious way.
6. There is a sense in which it is correct to say: "It's too good to be Camp." Or "too important," not marginal enough. (More on this later.) Thus, the personality and many of the works of Jean Cocteau are Camp, but not those of André Gide; the operas of Richard Strauss, but not those of Wagner; concoctions of Tin Pan Alley and Liverpool, but not jazz. Many examples of Camp are things which, from a "serious" point of view, are either bad art or kitsch. Not all, though. Not only is Camp not necessarily bad art, but some art which can be approached as Camp (example: the major films of Louis Feuillade) merits the most serious admiration and study.
"The more we study Art, the less we care for Nature."
- The Decay of Lying
7. All Camp objects, and persons, contain a large element of artifice. Nothing in nature can be campy . . . Rural Camp is still man-made, and most campy objects are urban. (Yet, they often have a serenity -- or a naiveté -- which is the equivalent of pastoral. A great deal of Camp suggests Empson's phrase, "urban pastoral.")
8. Camp is a vision of the world in terms of style -- but a particular kind of style. It is the love of the exaggerated, the "off," of things-being-what-they-are-not. The best example is in Art Nouveau, the most typical and fully developed Camp style. Art Nouveau objects, typically, convert one thing into something else: the lighting fixtures in the form of flowering plants, the living room which is really a grotto. A remarkable example: the Paris Métro entrances designed by Hector Guimard in the late 1890s in the shape of cast-iron orchid stalks.
9. As a taste in persons, Camp responds particularly to the markedly attenuated and to the strongly exaggerated. The androgyne is certainly one of the great images of Camp sensibility. Examples: the swooning, slim, sinuous figures of pre-Raphaelite painting and poetry; the thin, flowing, sexless bodies in Art Nouveau prints and posters, presented in relief on lamps and ashtrays; the haunting androgynous vacancy behind the perfect beauty of Greta Garbo. Here, Camp taste draws on a mostly unacknowledged truth of taste: the most refined form of sexual attractiveness (as well as the most refined form of sexual pleasure) consists in going against the grain of one's sex. What is most beautiful in virile men is something feminine; what is most beautiful in feminine women is something masculine. . . . Allied to the Camp taste for the androgynous is something that seems quite different but isn't: a relish for the exaggeration of sexual characteristics and personality mannerisms. For obvious reasons, the best examples that can be cited are movie stars. The corny flamboyant female-ness of Jayne Mansfield, Gina Lollobrigida, Jane Russell, Virginia Mayo; the exaggerated he-man-ness of Steve Reeves, Victor Mature. The great stylists of temperament and mannerism, like Bette Davis, Barbara Stanwyck, Tallulah Bankhead, Edwige Feuillière.
10. Camp sees everything in quotation marks. It's not a lamp, but a "lamp"; not a woman, but a "woman." To perceive Camp in objects and persons is to understand Being-as-Playing-a-Role. It is the farthest extension, in sensibility, of the metaphor of life as theater.
11. Camp is the triumph of the epicene style. (The convertibility of "man" and "woman," "person" and "thing.") But all style, that is, artifice, is, ultimately, epicene. Life is not stylish. Neither is nature.
12. The question isn't, "Why travesty, impersonation, theatricality?" The question is, rather, "When does travesty, impersonation, theatricality acquire the special flavor of Camp?" Why is the atmosphere of Shakespeare's comedies (As You Like It, etc.) not epicene, while that of Der Rosenkavalier is?
13. The dividing line seems to fall in the 18th century; there the origins of Camp taste are to be found (Gothic novels, Chinoiserie, caricature, artificial ruins, and so forth.) But the relation to nature was quite different then. In the 18th century, people of taste either patronized nature (Strawberry Hill) or attempted to remake it into something artificial (Versailles). They also indefatigably patronized the past. Today's Camp taste effaces nature, or else contradicts it outright. And the relation of Camp taste to the past is extremely sentimental.
14. A pocket history of Camp might, of course, begin farther back -- with the mannerist artists like Pontormo, Rosso, and Caravaggio, or the extraordinarily theatrical painting of Georges de La Tour, or Euphuism (Lyly, etc.) in literature. Still, the soundest starting point seems to be the late 17th and early 18th century, because of that period's extraordinary feeling for artifice, for surface, for symmetry; its taste for the picturesque and the thrilling, its elegant conventions for representing instant feeling and the total presence of character -- the epigram and the rhymed couplet (in words), the flourish (in gesture and in music). The late 17th and early 18th century is the great period of Camp: Pope, Congreve, Walpole, etc, but not Swift; les précieux in France; the rococo churches of Munich; Pergolesi. Somewhat later: much of Mozart. But in the 19th century, what had been distributed throughout all of high culture now becomes a special taste; it takes on overtones of the acute, the esoteric, the perverse. Confining the story to England alone, we see Camp continuing wanly through 19th century aestheticism (Bume-Jones, Pater, Ruskin, Tennyson), emerging full-blown with the Art Nouveau movement in the visual and decorative arts, and finding its conscious ideologists in such "wits" as Wilde and Firbank.
15. Of course, to say all these things are Camp is not to argue they are simply that. A full analysis of Art Nouveau, for instance, would scarcely equate it with Camp. But such an analysis cannot ignore what in Art Nouveau allows it to be experienced as Camp. Art Nouveau is full of "content," even of a political-moral sort; it was a revolutionary movement in the arts, spurred on by a Utopian vision (somewhere between William Morris and the Bauhaus group) of an organic politics and taste. Yet there is also a feature of the Art Nouveau objects which suggests a disengaged, unserious, "aesthete's" vision. This tells us something important about Art Nouveau -- and about what the lens of Camp, which blocks out content, is.
16. Thus, the Camp sensibility is one that is alive to a double sense in which some things can be taken. But this is not the familiar split-level construction of a literal meaning, on the one hand, and a symbolic meaning, on the other. It is the difference, rather, between the thing as meaning something, anything, and the thing as pure artifice.
17. This comes out clearly in the vulgar use of the word Camp as a verb, "to camp," something that people do. To camp is a mode of seduction -- one which employs flamboyant mannerisms susceptible of a double interpretation; gestures full of duplicity, with a witty meaning for cognoscenti and another, more impersonal, for outsiders. Equally and by extension, when the word becomes a noun, when a person or a thing is "a camp," a duplicity is involved. Behind the "straight" public sense in which something can be taken, one has found a private zany experience of the thing.
"To be natural is such a very difficult pose to keep up."
- An Ideal Husband
18. One must distinguish between naïve and deliberate Camp. Pure Camp is always naive. Camp which knows itself to be Camp ("camping") is usually less satisfying.
19. The pure examples of Camp are unintentional; they are dead serious. The Art Nouveau craftsman who makes a lamp with a snake coiled around it is not kidding, nor is he trying to be charming. He is saying, in all earnestness: Voilà! the Orient! Genuine Camp -- for instance, the numbers devised for the Warner Brothers musicals of the early thirties (42nd Street; The Golddiggers of 1933; ... of 1935; ... of 1937; etc.) by Busby Berkeley -- does not mean to be funny. Camping -- say, the plays of Noel Coward -- does. It seems unlikely that much of the traditional opera repertoire could be such satisfying Camp if the melodramatic absurdities of most opera plots had not been taken seriously by their composers. One doesn't need to know the artist's private intentions. The work tells all. (Compare a typical 19th century opera with Samuel Barber's Vanessa, a piece of manufactured, calculated Camp, and the difference is clear.)
20. Probably, intending to be campy is always harmful. The perfection of Trouble in Paradise and The Maltese Falcon, among the greatest Camp movies ever made, comes from the effortless smooth way in which tone is maintained. This is not so with such famous would-be Camp films of the fifties as All About Eve and Beat the Devil. These more recent movies have their fine moments, but the first is so slick and the second so hysterical; they want so badly to be campy that they're continually losing the beat. . . . Perhaps, though, it is not so much a question of the unintended effect versus the conscious intention, as of the delicate relation between parody and self-parody in Camp. The films of Hitchcock are a showcase for this problem. When self-parody lacks ebullience but instead reveals (even sporadically) a contempt for one's themes and one's materials - as in To Catch a Thief, Rear Window, North by Northwest -- the results are forced and heavy-handed, rarely Camp. Successful Camp -- a movie like Carné's Drôle de Drame; the film performances of Mae West and Edward Everett Horton; portions of the Goon Show -- even when it reveals self-parody, reeks of self-love.
21. So, again, Camp rests on innocence. That means Camp discloses innocence, but also, when it can, corrupts it. Objects, being objects, don't change when they are singled out by the Camp vision. Persons, however, respond to their audiences. Persons begin "camping": Mae West, Bea Lillie, La Lupe, Tallulah Bankhead in Lifeboat, Bette Davis in All About Eve. (Persons can even be induced to camp without their knowing it. Consider the way Fellini got Anita Ekberg to parody herself in La Dolce Vita.)
22. Considered a little less strictly, Camp is either completely naive or else wholly conscious (when one plays at being campy). An example of the latter: Wilde's epigrams themselves.
"It's absurd to divide people into good and bad. People are either charming or tedious."
- Lady Windemere's Fan
23. In naïve, or pure, Camp, the essential element is seriousness, a seriousness that fails. Of course, not all seriousness that fails can be redeemed as Camp. Only that which has the proper mixture of the exaggerated, the fantastic, the passionate, and the naïve.
24. When something is just bad (rather than Camp), it's often because it is too mediocre in its ambition. The artist hasn't attempted to do anything really outlandish. ("It's too much," "It's too fantastic," "It's not to be believed," are standard phrases of Camp enthusiasm.)
25. The hallmark of Camp is the spirit of extravagance. Camp is a woman walking around in a dress made of three million feathers. Camp is the paintings of Carlo Crivelli, with their real jewels and trompe-l'oeil insects and cracks in the masonry. Camp is the outrageous aestheticism of Steinberg's six American movies with Dietrich, all six, but especially the last, The Devil Is a Woman. . . . In Camp there is often something démesuré in the quality of the ambition, not only in the style of the work itself. Gaudí's lurid and beautiful buildings in Barcelona are Camp not only because of their style but because they reveal -- most notably in the Cathedral of the Sagrada Familia -- the ambition on the part of one man to do what it takes a generation, a whole culture to accomplish.
26. Camp is art that proposes itself seriously, but cannot be taken altogether seriously because it is "too much." Titus Andronicus and Strange Interlude are almost Camp, or could be played as Camp. The public manner and rhetoric of de Gaulle, often, are pure Camp.
27. A work can come close to Camp, but not make it, because it succeeds. Eisenstein's films are seldom Camp because, despite all exaggeration, they do succeed (dramatically) without surplus. If they were a little more "off," they could be great Camp - particularly Ivan the Terrible I & II. The same for Blake's drawings and paintings, weird and mannered as they are. They aren't Camp; though Art Nouveau, influenced by Blake, is.
What is extravagant in an inconsistent or an unpassionate way is not Camp. Neither can anything be Camp that does not seem to spring from an irrepressible, a virtually uncontrolled sensibility. Without passion, one gets pseudo-Camp -- what is merely decorative, safe, in a word, chic. On the barren edge of Camp lie a number of attractive things: the sleek fantasies of Dali, the haute couture preciosity of Albicocco's The Girl with the Golden Eyes. But the two things - Camp and preciosity - must not be confused.
28. Again, Camp is the attempt to do something extraordinary. But extraordinary in the sense, often, of being special, glamorous. (The curved line, the extravagant gesture.) Not extraordinary merely in the sense of effort. Ripley's Believe-It-Or-Not items are rarely campy. These items, either natural oddities (the two-headed rooster, the eggplant in the shape of a cross) or else the products of immense labor (the man who walked from here to China on his hands, the woman who engraved the New Testament on the head of a pin), lack the visual reward - the glamour, the theatricality - that marks off certain extravagances as Camp.
29. The reason a movie like On the Beach, books like Winesburg, Ohio and For Whom the Bell Tolls are bad to the point of being laughable, but not bad to the point of being enjoyable, is that they are too dogged and pretentious. They lack fantasy. There is Camp in such bad movies as The Prodigal and Samson and Delilah, the series of Italian color spectacles featuring the super-hero Maciste, numerous Japanese science fiction films (Rodan, The Mysterians, The H-Man) because, in their relative unpretentiousness and vulgarity, they are more extreme and irresponsible in their fantasy - and therefore touching and quite enjoyable.
30. Of course, the canon of Camp can change. Time has a great deal to do with it. Time may enhance what seems simply dogged or lacking in fantasy now because we are too close to it, because it resembles too closely our own everyday fantasies, the fantastic nature of which we don't perceive. We are better able to enjoy a fantasy as fantasy when it is not our own.
31. This is why so many of the objects prized by Camp taste are old-fashioned, out-of-date, démodé. It's not a love of the old as such. It's simply that the process of aging or deterioration provides the necessary detachment -- or arouses a necessary sympathy. When the theme is important, and contemporary, the failure of a work of art may make us indignant. Time can change that. Time liberates the work of art from moral relevance, delivering it over to the Camp sensibility. . . . Another effect: time contracts the sphere of banality. (Banality is, strictly speaking, always a category of the contemporary.) What was banal can, with the passage of time, become fantastic. Many people who listen with delight to the style of Rudy Vallee revived by the English pop group, The Temperance Seven, would have been driven up the wall by Rudy Vallee in his heyday.
Thus, things are campy, not when they become old - but when we become less involved in them, and can enjoy, instead of be frustrated by, the failure of the attempt. But the effect of time is unpredictable. Maybe Method acting (James Dean, Rod Steiger, Warren Beatty) will seem as Camp some day as Ruby Keeler's does now - or as Sarah Bernhardt's does, in the films she made at the end of her career. And maybe not.
32. Camp is the glorification of "character." The statement is of no importance - except, of course, to the person (Loie Fuller, Gaudí, Cecil B. De Mille, Crivelli, de Gaulle, etc.) who makes it. What the Camp eye appreciates is the unity, the force of the person. In every move the aging Martha Graham makes she's being Martha Graham, etc., etc. . . . This is clear in the case of the great serious idol of Camp taste, Greta Garbo. Garbo's incompetence (at the least, lack of depth) as an actress enhances her beauty. She's always herself.
33. What Camp taste responds to is "instant character" (this is, of course, very 18th century); and, conversely, what it is not stirred by is the sense of the development of character. Character is understood as a state of continual incandescence - a person being one, very intense thing. This attitude toward character is a key element of the theatricalization of experience embodied in the Camp sensibility. And it helps account for the fact that opera and ballet are experienced as such rich treasures of Camp, for neither of these forms can easily do justice to the complexity of human nature. Wherever there is development of character, Camp is reduced. Among operas, for example, La Traviata (which has some small development of character) is less campy than Il Trovatore (which has none).
"Life is too important a thing ever to talk seriously about it."
- Vera, or The Nihilists
34. Camp taste turns its back on the good-bad axis of ordinary aesthetic judgment. Camp doesn't reverse things. It doesn't argue that the good is bad, or the bad is good. What it does is to offer for art (and life) a different -- a supplementary -- set of standards.
35. Ordinarily we value a work of art because of the seriousness and dignity of what it achieves. We value it because it succeeds - in being what it is and, presumably, in fulfilling the intention that lies behind it. We assume a proper, that is to say, straightforward relation between intention and performance. By such standards, we appraise The Iliad, Aristophanes' plays, The Art of the Fugue, Middlemarch, the paintings of Rembrandt, Chartres, the poetry of Donne, The Divine Comedy, Beethoven's quartets, and - among people - Socrates, Jesus, St. Francis, Napoleon, Savonarola. In short, the pantheon of high culture: truth, beauty, and seriousness.
36. But there are other creative sensibilities besides the seriousness (both tragic and comic) of high culture and of the high style of evaluating people. And one cheats oneself, as a human being, if one has respect only for the style of high culture, whatever else one may do or feel on the sly.
For instance, there is the kind of seriousness whose trademark is anguish, cruelty, derangement. Here we do accept a disparity between intention and result. I am speaking, obviously, of a style of personal existence as well as of a style in art; but the examples had best come from art. Think of Bosch, Sade, Rimbaud, Jarry, Kafka, Artaud, think of most of the important works of art of the 20th century, that is, art whose goal is not that of creating harmonies but of overstraining the medium and introducing more and more violent, and unresolvable, subject-matter. This sensibility also insists on the principle that an oeuvre in the old sense (again, in art, but also in life) is not possible. Only "fragments" are possible. . . . Clearly, different standards apply here than to traditional high culture. Something is good not because it is achieved, but because another kind of truth about the human situation, another experience of what it is to be human - in short, another valid sensibility -- is being revealed.
And third among the great creative sensibilities is Camp: the sensibility of failed seriousness, of the theatricalization of experience. Camp refuses both the harmonies of traditional seriousness, and the risks of fully identifying with extreme states of feeling.
37. The first sensibility, that of high culture, is basically moralistic. The second sensibility, that of extreme states of feeling, represented in much contemporary "avant-garde" art, gains power by a tension between moral and aesthetic passion. The third, Camp, is wholly aesthetic.
38. Camp is the consistently aesthetic experience of the world. It incarnates a victory of "style" over "content," "aesthetics" over "morality," of irony over tragedy.
39. Camp and tragedy are antitheses. There is seriousness in Camp (seriousness in the degree of the artist's involvement) and, often, pathos. The excruciating is also one of the tonalities of Camp; it is the quality of excruciation in much of Henry James (for instance, The Europeans, The Awkward Age, The Wings of the Dove) that is responsible for the large element of Camp in his writings. But there is never, never tragedy.
40. Style is everything. Genet's ideas, for instance, are very Camp. Genet's statement that "the only criterion of an act is its elegance"2 is virtually interchangeable, as a statement, with Wilde's "in matters of great importance, the vital element is not sincerity, but style." But what counts, finally, is the style in which ideas are held. The ideas about morality and politics in, say, Lady Windemere's Fan and in Major Barbara are Camp, but not just because of the nature of the ideas themselves. It is those ideas, held in a special playful way. The Camp ideas in Our Lady of the Flowers are maintained too grimly, and the writing itself is too successfully elevated and serious, for Genet's books to be Camp.
41. The whole point of Camp is to dethrone the serious. Camp is playful, anti-serious. More precisely, Camp involves a new, more complex relation to "the serious." One can be serious about the frivolous, frivolous about the serious.
42. One is drawn to Camp when one realizes that "sincerity" is not enough. Sincerity can be simple philistinism, intellectual narrowness.
43. The traditional means for going beyond straight seriousness - irony, satire - seem feeble today, inadequate to the culturally oversaturated medium in which contemporary sensibility is schooled. Camp introduces a new standard: artifice as an ideal, theatricality.
44. Camp proposes a comic vision of the world. But not a bitter or polemical comedy. If tragedy is an experience of hyperinvolvement, comedy is an experience of underinvolvement, of detachment.
"I adore simple pleasures, they are the last refuge of the complex."
- A Woman of No Importance
45. Detachment is the prerogative of an elite; and as the dandy is the 19th century's surrogate for the aristocrat in matters of culture, so Camp is the modern dandyism. Camp is the answer to the problem: how to be a dandy in the age of mass culture.
46. The dandy was overbred. His posture was disdain, or else ennui. He sought rare sensations, undefiled by mass appreciation. (Models: Des Esseintes in Huysmans' À Rebours, Marius the Epicurean, Valéry's Monsieur Teste.) He was dedicated to "good taste."
The connoisseur of Camp has found more ingenious pleasures. Not in Latin poetry and rare wines and velvet jackets, but in the coarsest, commonest pleasures, in the arts of the masses. Mere use does not defile the objects of his pleasure, since he learns to possess them in a rare way. Camp -- Dandyism in the age of mass culture -- makes no distinction between the unique object and the mass-produced object. Camp taste transcends the nausea of the replica.
47. Wilde himself is a transitional figure. The man who, when he first came to London, sported a velvet beret, lace shirts, velveteen knee-breeches and black silk stockings, could never depart too far in his life from the pleasures of the old-style dandy; this conservatism is reflected in The Picture of Dorian Gray. But many of his attitudes suggest something more modern. It was Wilde who formulated an important element of the Camp sensibility -- the equivalence of all objects -- when he announced his intention of "living up" to his blue-and-white china, or declared that a doorknob could be as admirable as a painting. When he proclaimed the importance of the necktie, the boutonniere, the chair, Wilde was anticipating the democratic esprit of Camp.
48. The old-style dandy hated vulgarity. The new-style dandy, the lover of Camp, appreciates vulgarity. Where the dandy would be continually offended or bored, the connoisseur of Camp is continually amused, delighted. The dandy held a perfumed handkerchief to his nostrils and was liable to swoon; the connoisseur of Camp sniffs the stink and prides himself on his strong nerves.
49. It is a feat, of course. A feat goaded on, in the last analysis, by the threat of boredom. The relation between boredom and Camp taste cannot be overestimated. Camp taste is by its nature possible only in affluent societies, in societies or circles capable of experiencing the psychopathology of affluence.
"What is abnormal in Life stands in normal relations to Art. It is the only thing in Life that stands in normal relations to Art."
- A Few Maxims for the Instruction of the Over-Educated
50. Aristocracy is a position vis-à-vis culture (as well as vis-à-vis power), and the history of Camp taste is part of the history of snob taste. But since no authentic aristocrats in the old sense exist today to sponsor special tastes, who is the bearer of this taste? Answer: an improvised self-elected class, mainly homosexuals, who constitute themselves as aristocrats of taste.
51. The peculiar relation between Camp taste and homosexuality has to be explained. While it's not true that Camp taste is homosexual taste, there is no doubt a peculiar affinity and overlap. Not all liberals are Jews, but Jews have shown a peculiar affinity for liberal and reformist causes. So, not all homosexuals have Camp taste. But homosexuals, by and large, constitute the vanguard -- and the most articulate audience -- of Camp. (The analogy is not frivolously chosen. Jews and homosexuals are the outstanding creative minorities in contemporary urban culture. Creative, that is, in the truest sense: they are creators of sensibilities. The two pioneering forces of modern sensibility are Jewish moral seriousness and homosexual aestheticism and irony.)
52. The reason for the flourishing of the aristocratic posture among homosexuals also seems to parallel the Jewish case. For every sensibility is self-serving to the group that promotes it. Jewish liberalism is a gesture of self-legitimization. So is Camp taste, which definitely has something propagandistic about it. Needless to say, the propaganda operates in exactly the opposite direction. The Jews pinned their hopes for integrating into modern society on promoting the moral sense. Homosexuals have pinned their integration into society on promoting the aesthetic sense. Camp is a solvent of morality. It neutralizes moral indignation, sponsors playfulness.
53. Nevertheless, even though homosexuals have been its vanguard, Camp taste is much more than homosexual taste. Obviously, its metaphor of life as theater is peculiarly suited as a justification and projection of a certain aspect of the situation of homosexuals. (The Camp insistence on not being "serious," on playing, also connects with the homosexual's desire to remain youthful.) Yet one feels that if homosexuals hadn't more or less invented Camp, someone else would. For the aristocratic posture with relation to culture cannot die, though it may persist only in increasingly arbitrary and ingenious ways. Camp is (to repeat) the relation to style in a time in which the adoption of style -- as such -- has become altogether questionable. (In the modem era, each new style, unless frankly anachronistic, has come on the scene as an anti-style.)
"One must have a heart of stone to read the death of Little Nell without laughing."
- In conversation
54. The experiences of Camp are based on the great discovery that the sensibility of high culture has no monopoly upon refinement. Camp asserts that good taste is not simply good taste; that there exists, indeed, a good taste of bad taste. (Genet talks about this in Our Lady of the Flowers.) The discovery of the good taste of bad taste can be very liberating. The man who insists on high and serious pleasures is depriving himself of pleasure; he continually restricts what he can enjoy; in the constant exercise of his good taste he will eventually price himself out of the market, so to speak. Here Camp taste supervenes upon good taste as a daring and witty hedonism. It makes the man of good taste cheerful, where before he ran the risk of being chronically frustrated. It is good for the digestion.
55. Camp taste is, above all, a mode of enjoyment, of appreciation - not judgment. Camp is generous. It wants to enjoy. It only seems like malice, cynicism. (Or, if it is cynicism, it's not a ruthless but a sweet cynicism.) Camp taste doesn't propose that it is in bad taste to be serious; it doesn't sneer at someone who succeeds in being seriously dramatic. What it does is to find the success in certain passionate failures.
56. Camp taste is a kind of love, love for human nature. It relishes, rather than judges, the little triumphs and awkward intensities of "character." . . . Camp taste identifies with what it is enjoying. People who share this sensibility are not laughing at the thing they label as "a camp," they're enjoying it. Camp is a tender feeling.
(Here, one may compare Camp with much of Pop Art, which -- when it is not just Camp -- embodies an attitude that is related, but still very different. Pop Art is more flat and more dry, more serious, more detached, ultimately nihilistic.)
57. Camp taste nourishes itself on the love that has gone into certain objects and personal styles. The absence of this love is the reason why such kitsch items as Peyton Place (the book) and the Tishman Building aren't Camp.
58. The ultimate Camp statement: it's good because it's awful . . . Of course, one can't always say that. Only under certain conditions, those which I've tried to sketch in these notes.
ESTETIKA-HERBERT READ DG 1A
HERBERT READ
Biografi
Sir Herbert Read adalah seorang profesor seni rupa di Universitas Edinburgh 1931-1933 dan seorang dosen seni di Universitas Liverpool (1935-36).Selama Perang Dunia II Read responsif terhadap ideologi 'perang rakyat'. Namun, sesuai dengan keyakinan politik anarkis, Read berpendapat dalam To Hell with culture (1941) “Persetan dengan budaya, kebudayaan sebagai hal yang ditambahkan seperti saus ikan basi jika tidak enak!”. Setelah perang Read bekerjasama dengan Roland Penrose dan Eduardo Paolozzi Institut Seni Kontemporer (ICA) di London,tujuannya adalah untuk menurunkan penghalang antar berbagai disiplin artistik.
Keserasian menurut Read
Keserasian berasal dari kata serasi dan dari kata dasar rasi, artinya cocok, kena benar dan sesuai itu mengandung unsur perpaduan, pertentangan, ukuran dan keseimbangan. Dalam keindahan ini sebagai ahli pikiran penjelasan, bahwa keindahan pada dasarnya adalah sejumlah kualitas atau pokok tertentu yang terdapat pada suatu hal yang paling sering disebut kesatuan
Pendapat Herbert Read
Herbert Read mendefinisikan bahwa keindahan adalah kesatuan dan hubungan-hubungan bentuk yang terdapat diantara pencerapan-pencerapan inderawi kita.
Pada umumnya orang beranggapan bahwa yang indah adalah seni atau bahwa seni adalah selalu indah, dan bahwa yang tidak indah bukanlah seni. Pandangan semacam ini akan menyulitkan masyarakat dalam mengapresiasi seni sebab ini tidak harus selalu indah, menurut pendapat Herbert Read.
Dalam seri buku, seperti The Meaning of Art (1930), Art Now (1933),Read berpendapat untuk 'bentuk organik' dan kebutuhan seni dalam pendidikan. Read telah mengadopsi ide dari Freud, Jung, Hegel, Schiller, dan Marx. Dia telah mengembangkan untuk keburukan industrialisme, dan menyangkal bahwa ada "hubungan yang diperlukan antara keindahan dan fungsi". English prose style (1928) mencerminkan kekecewaan terhadap era pasca perang dan kemegahan palsu. Read memuji kebaikan kesederhanaan, bahkan jika sekalipun itu kering dan rata - setidaknya itu menyampaikan perasaan kebenaran.
Keindahan adalah kesadaran nilai yang muncul di dalam presepsi kita yang muncul sewaktu menanggapi ekspresi suatu objek. Keindahan adalah unsur emosional suatu perasaan terpesona yang menyenangkan pada diri kita, yang ditimbulkan dari unsur-unsur karya keindahan merupakan kesadaran yang bersifat apresiatif, suatu sensasi yang membangkitkan kekaguman dan penghargaan.
Teori-teori yang dikemukakan Herbert Read
(a). Teori Objektif dan teori subjektif
Teori Objektif berpendapat bahwa keindahan atau ciri – ciri yang menciptakan nilai estetik adalah sifat (kualitas) yang memang telah melekat pada bentuk indah yang bersangkutan, terlepas dari orang yang mengamatinya.
Teori Subjektif menyatakan bahwa ciri – ciri yang menciptakan keindahan suatu benda itu tidak ada, yang ada hanya perasaan dalam diri seseorang yang mengamati sesuatu benda.
Teori atau konsep Yunani lama cenderung kepada konsep objektif, dimana keindahan karya dapat dicapai apabila bagian-bagiannya dapat diatur secara harmonis berdasarkan prinsip-prinsip tertentu. Itulah sebabnya ”The Great Theory of Beauty”. Yang menerapkan prinsip matematika sebagai acuan keindahan arsitektur Yunani.
Perbandingan sebagai acuan yang menetapkan standar keindahan karya, yang dapat menimbulkan perasaan puas untuk sementara waktu. Sementara itu konsep seni Herbert Read dan Santayana berpegang pada konsep modern yang beranggapan bahwa ”seni tidak selalu menyenangkan?” Ideal keindahan dapat bervariasi dan sangat tergantung kepada ideal dari tata nilai kehidupan. Keindahan adalah nilai (value)yang dibentuk cita rasa perasaan manusia yang bersifat subjektif, sebagai tangapan emosional terhadap kualitas bentuk suatu karya
b). Teori Perimbangan
Keindahan hanya ada pada pikiran orang yang menerangkannya dan setiap pikiran melihat suatu keindahan yang berbeda – beda.
Materi Tambahan :
Pada umumnya orang beranggapan bahwa yang indah adalah seni atau bahwa seni adalah selalu indah, dan bahwa yang tidak indah bukanlah seni. Pandangan semacam ini akan menyulitkan masyarakat dalam mengapresiasi seni sebab seni tidak selalu harus indah, demikian pendapat Herbert Read.
Konsep bahwa seni selalu indah, bahwa seni adalah idealisasi dari alam oleh manusia (ars homo additus nature) seperti yang dianut kebudayaan Yunani kuno sebenarnya adalah salah satu dari yang ada. Ia berbeda dengan ideal seni Cina dan seni India yang cendrung kepada bentuk yang metafisik, abstrak, religius dan lebih bertumpu pada intuisi daripada rasio. Juga berlainan daripada ideal seni bangsa primitif, yang lebih dekat dengan perasaan takut pada gejala alam yang misterius serta keyakinan mereka akan adanya kekuatan gaib yang mengatur hidup mereka.
Seperti karya seni patung aprodite Yunani, patung Budha dari India dan patung berhala dari Irian Jaya adalah mengungkapkan ideal bentuk yang berbeda, sekalipun ketiganya tergolong cabang seni yang sama. Penampilan bentuk aprodite yang serba indah sempurna dan realistis, bentuk Budha yang wajar religius, maupun bentuk patung manusia primitif yang serba menkutkan dan tidak realistis (abstrak) semuanya secara sah dapat digolongkan menjadi karya seni.
Pada dasarnya seni bukanlah sekedar ekspresi dari setiap ideal yang spesifik dalam bentuk yang plastis. Seni adalah ekspresi dari semua ideal yang dapat diungkapkan oleh seniman kedalam tata bentuk plastis yang berkualitas estetis, baik yang serba menyenangkan maupun menakutkan, mengharukan bahkan memuakkan. Nampak bahwa seni tidak selalu mesti indah dan menyenangkan, keindahan harus diartikan sebagai kualitas abstrak yang merupakan landasan elementer bagi kegiatan artistik. Eksponen penting dalam kegiatan ini adalah manusia sedangkan kegiatannya diarahkan untuk menghayati serta menjiwai tata kehidupan (diantaranya termasuk kehidupan estetis).
Dalam peristiwa kegiatan terjadi tiga tahapan, pertama; proses pengamatan perseptual (indrawi) terhadap kualitas materi dari unsur-unsur gerak, warna suara, bentuk dan reaksi-reaksi fisiologis lain yang kompleks. Yang kedua; tata susunan dari kualitas materi tersebut yang tejalin secara organik dalam tatanan bentuk dan pola yang harmonis. Melalui kedua tahapan penghayatan tersebut muncullah kesadaran estetis.
Tahap yang ketiga adalah yang muncul apabila tata susunan yang harmonis tersebut dengan sengaja diciptakan untuk berkorespondensi dengan perasaan (emosi). Maka dapat dikatakan, bahwa emosi atau perasaan itu akan memberikan ekspresi sebagai unsur komunikasi . dalam hal inilah dikatakan bahwa seni adalah ekspresi dan bahwa tujuan sebenarnya dari seni adalah untuk mengkomunikasikan perasaan melalui tatanan bentuk plastis yang harmonis. Sedangkan arti dari keindahan, sebenarnya lebih mengacu pada perasaan yang dikomunikasikan lewat tata bentuk itu.
Sebenarnya unsur permanen dalam diri manusia yang berkorespondensi dengan unsur-unsur bentuk dari seni adalah kepekaan (perasaan) estetis. Jadi kepekaan estetis ini bersifat tetap, sedangkan yang bervariasi adalah pengertian-pengertian yang dibentuk manusia atas abstraksi terhadap impresi-impresi dari indrawi kehidupan unsur-unsur variasi dalam seni yakni apa yang dimaksud dengan ekspresi. Oleh karena ekspresi dipandang sebagai ungkapan gejala kejiwaan yaitu "The transformation af an element of sensation into the qualy of thing"? demikian G. santayana (The sense of beauty). Apabila orang melihat sesuatu obyek mengandung keindahan maka ia melihat dan merasakan adanya tatanan nilai yang harmonis baik dalam tata bentuk, tata warna, proporsi maupun susunan dari obyek.
Keindahan adalah kesadaran nilai yang muncul di dalam presepsi kita yang muncul sewaktu menanggapi ekspresi sesuatu obyek. Keindahan adalah unsur emosional sesuatu perasaan terpesona yang menyenangkan pada diri kita, yang ditimbulkan dari unsur-unsur karya keindahan merupakan kesadaran yang bersifat apresiatif, suatu sensasi yang membangkitkan kekaguman dan penghargaan.
Dari uraian diatas dapat diringkaskan bahwa sebenarnya terdapat konsep tentang "keindahan"?, yaitu konsep obyektif dan konsep subyektif.
Konsep obyektif beranggapan bahwa keindahan adalah sifat atau kualitas yang secara intern melekat pada suatu karya yang tidak tergantung kepada proses pengamatan/penafsiran. Keindahan adalah ciri dari suatu obyek yang ditimbulkan oleh adanya keserasian (harmoni) diantara bagian-bagiannya, sehingga memenuhi prinsip-prinsip tertentu.
Konsep subyektif menganggap bahwa keindahan sebenarnya hanya tanggapan perasaan dalam diri kita sewaktu mengamati karya yang harmonis tersebut. Jadi sangat tergantung kepada tanggapan kita masing-masing untuk menilai apakah karya tersebut indah atau tidak.
Teori/konsep Yunani lama lebih cendrung kepada konsep obyektif, dimana keindahan karya dapat dicapai apabila bagian-bagiannya dapat diatur secara harmonis berdasarkan prinsip-prinsip tertentu. Itulah sebabnya lahir "The great theory of beauty"? yang menerapkan prinsip matematika sebagi acuan keindahan arsitektur Yunani. Kita kenal apa yang disebut perbandingan sebagai acuan yang menetapkan standar keindahan karya, yang dapat menimbulkan perasaan puas untuk sementara waktu.
Sementara itu konsep seni Herbert Read dan Santayana berpegang kepada konsep modern, yang beranggapan bahwa "seni tidak selau indah menyenangkan"? ideal keindahan dapat bervariasi dan sangat tergantung kepada ideal dari tata nilai kehidupan. Keindahan adalah nilai (value) yang dibentuk citarasa perasaan manusia yang bersifat subyektif, sebagai tanggapan emosional terhadap kualitas bentuk suatu karya.
Adanya dua konsep yang saling berlawanan (obyektif-subyektif) yang saling berlawanan itu melahirkan konsep lain yang bersifat kompromi, yaitu teori "Einfhulung"? dari Friederick Vischer. Teori ini berasumsi bahwa dalam proses pengamatan suatu karya seni, kita sebenarnya tanpa disadari telah menempatkan diri kita sendiri ke dalam karya seni tersebut. Einfhulung berarti keadaan merasakan diri sendiri atau memproyeksikan diri ke dalam obyek dalam peristiwa ini kita menghayati serta menikmati (secara transdental) kualitas bentuk karya sehingga menimbulkan sensasi kenikmatan serta perasaan yang menyenangkan. Proyeksi perasaan dari pengamat bersifat subyektif, sementara kualitas tata bentuk obyek yang diamati bersifat obyektif. Dalam peristiwa ini telah terjadi interaksi perseptual antara kualitas obyektif karya dengan subyektif dari pengamat. Pada dasarnya seni memang sengaja diciptakan untuk berkorespondensi dan berinteraksi dengan perasaan estetis manusia, sehingga menimbulkan kesadaran apresiasi aktif baik yang menyenangkan, mengharukan, menggelikan atau menakutkan bahkan memuakkan. Dengan begitu seniman dituntut kreatif dan komunikatif.
Biografi
Sir Herbert Read adalah seorang profesor seni rupa di Universitas Edinburgh 1931-1933 dan seorang dosen seni di Universitas Liverpool (1935-36).Selama Perang Dunia II Read responsif terhadap ideologi 'perang rakyat'. Namun, sesuai dengan keyakinan politik anarkis, Read berpendapat dalam To Hell with culture (1941) “Persetan dengan budaya, kebudayaan sebagai hal yang ditambahkan seperti saus ikan basi jika tidak enak!”. Setelah perang Read bekerjasama dengan Roland Penrose dan Eduardo Paolozzi Institut Seni Kontemporer (ICA) di London,tujuannya adalah untuk menurunkan penghalang antar berbagai disiplin artistik.
Keserasian menurut Read
Keserasian berasal dari kata serasi dan dari kata dasar rasi, artinya cocok, kena benar dan sesuai itu mengandung unsur perpaduan, pertentangan, ukuran dan keseimbangan. Dalam keindahan ini sebagai ahli pikiran penjelasan, bahwa keindahan pada dasarnya adalah sejumlah kualitas atau pokok tertentu yang terdapat pada suatu hal yang paling sering disebut kesatuan
Pendapat Herbert Read
Herbert Read mendefinisikan bahwa keindahan adalah kesatuan dan hubungan-hubungan bentuk yang terdapat diantara pencerapan-pencerapan inderawi kita.
Pada umumnya orang beranggapan bahwa yang indah adalah seni atau bahwa seni adalah selalu indah, dan bahwa yang tidak indah bukanlah seni. Pandangan semacam ini akan menyulitkan masyarakat dalam mengapresiasi seni sebab ini tidak harus selalu indah, menurut pendapat Herbert Read.
Dalam seri buku, seperti The Meaning of Art (1930), Art Now (1933),Read berpendapat untuk 'bentuk organik' dan kebutuhan seni dalam pendidikan. Read telah mengadopsi ide dari Freud, Jung, Hegel, Schiller, dan Marx. Dia telah mengembangkan untuk keburukan industrialisme, dan menyangkal bahwa ada "hubungan yang diperlukan antara keindahan dan fungsi". English prose style (1928) mencerminkan kekecewaan terhadap era pasca perang dan kemegahan palsu. Read memuji kebaikan kesederhanaan, bahkan jika sekalipun itu kering dan rata - setidaknya itu menyampaikan perasaan kebenaran.
Keindahan adalah kesadaran nilai yang muncul di dalam presepsi kita yang muncul sewaktu menanggapi ekspresi suatu objek. Keindahan adalah unsur emosional suatu perasaan terpesona yang menyenangkan pada diri kita, yang ditimbulkan dari unsur-unsur karya keindahan merupakan kesadaran yang bersifat apresiatif, suatu sensasi yang membangkitkan kekaguman dan penghargaan.
Teori-teori yang dikemukakan Herbert Read
(a). Teori Objektif dan teori subjektif
Teori Objektif berpendapat bahwa keindahan atau ciri – ciri yang menciptakan nilai estetik adalah sifat (kualitas) yang memang telah melekat pada bentuk indah yang bersangkutan, terlepas dari orang yang mengamatinya.
Teori Subjektif menyatakan bahwa ciri – ciri yang menciptakan keindahan suatu benda itu tidak ada, yang ada hanya perasaan dalam diri seseorang yang mengamati sesuatu benda.
Teori atau konsep Yunani lama cenderung kepada konsep objektif, dimana keindahan karya dapat dicapai apabila bagian-bagiannya dapat diatur secara harmonis berdasarkan prinsip-prinsip tertentu. Itulah sebabnya ”The Great Theory of Beauty”. Yang menerapkan prinsip matematika sebagai acuan keindahan arsitektur Yunani.
Perbandingan sebagai acuan yang menetapkan standar keindahan karya, yang dapat menimbulkan perasaan puas untuk sementara waktu. Sementara itu konsep seni Herbert Read dan Santayana berpegang pada konsep modern yang beranggapan bahwa ”seni tidak selalu menyenangkan?” Ideal keindahan dapat bervariasi dan sangat tergantung kepada ideal dari tata nilai kehidupan. Keindahan adalah nilai (value)yang dibentuk cita rasa perasaan manusia yang bersifat subjektif, sebagai tangapan emosional terhadap kualitas bentuk suatu karya
b). Teori Perimbangan
Keindahan hanya ada pada pikiran orang yang menerangkannya dan setiap pikiran melihat suatu keindahan yang berbeda – beda.
Materi Tambahan :
Pada umumnya orang beranggapan bahwa yang indah adalah seni atau bahwa seni adalah selalu indah, dan bahwa yang tidak indah bukanlah seni. Pandangan semacam ini akan menyulitkan masyarakat dalam mengapresiasi seni sebab seni tidak selalu harus indah, demikian pendapat Herbert Read.
Konsep bahwa seni selalu indah, bahwa seni adalah idealisasi dari alam oleh manusia (ars homo additus nature) seperti yang dianut kebudayaan Yunani kuno sebenarnya adalah salah satu dari yang ada. Ia berbeda dengan ideal seni Cina dan seni India yang cendrung kepada bentuk yang metafisik, abstrak, religius dan lebih bertumpu pada intuisi daripada rasio. Juga berlainan daripada ideal seni bangsa primitif, yang lebih dekat dengan perasaan takut pada gejala alam yang misterius serta keyakinan mereka akan adanya kekuatan gaib yang mengatur hidup mereka.
Seperti karya seni patung aprodite Yunani, patung Budha dari India dan patung berhala dari Irian Jaya adalah mengungkapkan ideal bentuk yang berbeda, sekalipun ketiganya tergolong cabang seni yang sama. Penampilan bentuk aprodite yang serba indah sempurna dan realistis, bentuk Budha yang wajar religius, maupun bentuk patung manusia primitif yang serba menkutkan dan tidak realistis (abstrak) semuanya secara sah dapat digolongkan menjadi karya seni.
Pada dasarnya seni bukanlah sekedar ekspresi dari setiap ideal yang spesifik dalam bentuk yang plastis. Seni adalah ekspresi dari semua ideal yang dapat diungkapkan oleh seniman kedalam tata bentuk plastis yang berkualitas estetis, baik yang serba menyenangkan maupun menakutkan, mengharukan bahkan memuakkan. Nampak bahwa seni tidak selalu mesti indah dan menyenangkan, keindahan harus diartikan sebagai kualitas abstrak yang merupakan landasan elementer bagi kegiatan artistik. Eksponen penting dalam kegiatan ini adalah manusia sedangkan kegiatannya diarahkan untuk menghayati serta menjiwai tata kehidupan (diantaranya termasuk kehidupan estetis).
Dalam peristiwa kegiatan terjadi tiga tahapan, pertama; proses pengamatan perseptual (indrawi) terhadap kualitas materi dari unsur-unsur gerak, warna suara, bentuk dan reaksi-reaksi fisiologis lain yang kompleks. Yang kedua; tata susunan dari kualitas materi tersebut yang tejalin secara organik dalam tatanan bentuk dan pola yang harmonis. Melalui kedua tahapan penghayatan tersebut muncullah kesadaran estetis.
Tahap yang ketiga adalah yang muncul apabila tata susunan yang harmonis tersebut dengan sengaja diciptakan untuk berkorespondensi dengan perasaan (emosi). Maka dapat dikatakan, bahwa emosi atau perasaan itu akan memberikan ekspresi sebagai unsur komunikasi . dalam hal inilah dikatakan bahwa seni adalah ekspresi dan bahwa tujuan sebenarnya dari seni adalah untuk mengkomunikasikan perasaan melalui tatanan bentuk plastis yang harmonis. Sedangkan arti dari keindahan, sebenarnya lebih mengacu pada perasaan yang dikomunikasikan lewat tata bentuk itu.
Sebenarnya unsur permanen dalam diri manusia yang berkorespondensi dengan unsur-unsur bentuk dari seni adalah kepekaan (perasaan) estetis. Jadi kepekaan estetis ini bersifat tetap, sedangkan yang bervariasi adalah pengertian-pengertian yang dibentuk manusia atas abstraksi terhadap impresi-impresi dari indrawi kehidupan unsur-unsur variasi dalam seni yakni apa yang dimaksud dengan ekspresi. Oleh karena ekspresi dipandang sebagai ungkapan gejala kejiwaan yaitu "The transformation af an element of sensation into the qualy of thing"? demikian G. santayana (The sense of beauty). Apabila orang melihat sesuatu obyek mengandung keindahan maka ia melihat dan merasakan adanya tatanan nilai yang harmonis baik dalam tata bentuk, tata warna, proporsi maupun susunan dari obyek.
Keindahan adalah kesadaran nilai yang muncul di dalam presepsi kita yang muncul sewaktu menanggapi ekspresi sesuatu obyek. Keindahan adalah unsur emosional sesuatu perasaan terpesona yang menyenangkan pada diri kita, yang ditimbulkan dari unsur-unsur karya keindahan merupakan kesadaran yang bersifat apresiatif, suatu sensasi yang membangkitkan kekaguman dan penghargaan.
Dari uraian diatas dapat diringkaskan bahwa sebenarnya terdapat konsep tentang "keindahan"?, yaitu konsep obyektif dan konsep subyektif.
Konsep obyektif beranggapan bahwa keindahan adalah sifat atau kualitas yang secara intern melekat pada suatu karya yang tidak tergantung kepada proses pengamatan/penafsiran. Keindahan adalah ciri dari suatu obyek yang ditimbulkan oleh adanya keserasian (harmoni) diantara bagian-bagiannya, sehingga memenuhi prinsip-prinsip tertentu.
Konsep subyektif menganggap bahwa keindahan sebenarnya hanya tanggapan perasaan dalam diri kita sewaktu mengamati karya yang harmonis tersebut. Jadi sangat tergantung kepada tanggapan kita masing-masing untuk menilai apakah karya tersebut indah atau tidak.
Teori/konsep Yunani lama lebih cendrung kepada konsep obyektif, dimana keindahan karya dapat dicapai apabila bagian-bagiannya dapat diatur secara harmonis berdasarkan prinsip-prinsip tertentu. Itulah sebabnya lahir "The great theory of beauty"? yang menerapkan prinsip matematika sebagi acuan keindahan arsitektur Yunani. Kita kenal apa yang disebut perbandingan sebagai acuan yang menetapkan standar keindahan karya, yang dapat menimbulkan perasaan puas untuk sementara waktu.
Sementara itu konsep seni Herbert Read dan Santayana berpegang kepada konsep modern, yang beranggapan bahwa "seni tidak selau indah menyenangkan"? ideal keindahan dapat bervariasi dan sangat tergantung kepada ideal dari tata nilai kehidupan. Keindahan adalah nilai (value) yang dibentuk citarasa perasaan manusia yang bersifat subyektif, sebagai tanggapan emosional terhadap kualitas bentuk suatu karya.
Adanya dua konsep yang saling berlawanan (obyektif-subyektif) yang saling berlawanan itu melahirkan konsep lain yang bersifat kompromi, yaitu teori "Einfhulung"? dari Friederick Vischer. Teori ini berasumsi bahwa dalam proses pengamatan suatu karya seni, kita sebenarnya tanpa disadari telah menempatkan diri kita sendiri ke dalam karya seni tersebut. Einfhulung berarti keadaan merasakan diri sendiri atau memproyeksikan diri ke dalam obyek dalam peristiwa ini kita menghayati serta menikmati (secara transdental) kualitas bentuk karya sehingga menimbulkan sensasi kenikmatan serta perasaan yang menyenangkan. Proyeksi perasaan dari pengamat bersifat subyektif, sementara kualitas tata bentuk obyek yang diamati bersifat obyektif. Dalam peristiwa ini telah terjadi interaksi perseptual antara kualitas obyektif karya dengan subyektif dari pengamat. Pada dasarnya seni memang sengaja diciptakan untuk berkorespondensi dan berinteraksi dengan perasaan estetis manusia, sehingga menimbulkan kesadaran apresiasi aktif baik yang menyenangkan, mengharukan, menggelikan atau menakutkan bahkan memuakkan. Dengan begitu seniman dituntut kreatif dan komunikatif.
SUSUNAN NIRMANA
-tugas kelas
susunan warna primer ke dalam bentuk lingkaran
susunan warna sekunder ke dalam bentuk sgi3
susunan warna tersier
sus. warna dingin
sus. warna panas
UTS kolase
warna tint
warna terikat
warna senada oren kuning = fa
balok
transparan
-tugas rumah
ligkaran warna
sus. garis dgan ktbalan (yga da 9... kotk tea)
perbesaran sus. garis
sgi 3 dlm lgkran
kotak dlm lgkran
gbungan lgkran
warna kontras/komplementer
shade
potongan lngkaran dlam persegi menggunakan wrna kntras
tekstur semuuuuu
Selasa, 15 Desember 2009
Sabtu, 12 Desember 2009
PEMBERITAHUAN
1. ada yg mau jadi admin lagi gak ? kesempatan dibuka hanya untuk 1 orang.
2. liburan kapan sih ?? hehe
2. liburan kapan sih ?? hehe